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THE DUTY TO DEFEND UNDER NON-
INSURANCE INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS:
CRAWFORD V. WEATHER SHIELD
MANUFACTURING, INC. AND ITS TROUBLING
CONSEQUENCES FOR DESIGN
PROFESSIONALS*
Gilson S. Riecken**
I. INTRODUCTION
In Crawford v. Weather Shield Manufacturing, Inc.,' the
California Supreme Court considered a subcontractor's duty
to provide the legal defense for a developer under an
indemnification and defense agreement.2 The Crawford court
unanimously held that unless parties expressly provide
otherwise, every contract to indemnify a person includes a
duty to defend that person in any lawsuit potentially
embraced by the indemnity.3 This defense duty arises "before
the litigation to be defended has determined whether
indemnity is actually owed ... [and], therefore cannot depend
*The case UDC-Universal Dev. v. CH2M Hillapplied Crawford to an
engineering firm and did not require the plaintiff to have specifically named the
firm to trigger its duty to defend a developer under an indemnity and defense
agreement. UDC-Universal Dev. v. CH2M Hill, No. H033610, 2010 WL 144353,
*3-9 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2010). This case was decided after this article was
written and thus was not included, but it is consistent with the views expressed
herein.
**Distinguished Research Adjunct in Law (2008-2009), Santa Clara University
School of Law. I wish to specifically acknowledge Dean Donald Polden and the
faculty and staff of the Santa Clara University, School of Law for providing the
resources to research and write this article, and Professor Marina Hsieh for
encouraging me to pursue the research. I also wish to acknowledge the law
librarians at the Heafey Law Library for their assistance on historical and
background research for this article, and Santa Clara University for providing
me with the opportunity to research and write it.
1. Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 187 P.3d 424 (Cal. 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 434.
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on the outcome of that litigation." The Crawford court
affirmed a judgment requiring the subcontractor to pay the
developer's defense costs, notwithstanding a jury verdict
exonerating the subcontractor of all fault.5
There are two bases upon which the Crawford court could
have held the innocent subcontractor responsible for the
developer's defense: either the defense duties spelled out in
the subcontract's defense clause,6 or a statutorily implied duty
that the court said exists by default under every indemnity
clause.7 Unfortunately for subcontractors, and particularly
for design professionals, the latter basis appears more central
to the decision.
This article examines the Crawford decision and its
potential consequences, and emphasizes its particular impact
on design professionals. Part II begins with a brief summary
of the Crawford decision8 and proceeds to test whether the
decision actually constitutes the "narrow issue" of contract
interpretation 9 that the court purports to have undertaken."
Part III analyzes the Crawford court's stated bases for
imposing defense liability upon the subcontractor and argues
that the statutory basis appears more central to the holding."
This section also discusses the treatment of the defense duty
in previous California cases dealing with construction law,
including a fourteen-year-old appellate decision disapproved
by Crawford,2 and examines whether other jurisdictions
might similarly impose a defense duty on non-insurance
4. Id. (emphasis added).
5. Id. at 427.
6. Id. ("In the contract, Weather Shield promised (1) 'to indemnify and save
[Peters] harmless against all claims for damages[,] ... loss .... and/or theft...
growing out of the execution of Weather Shield's work,' and (2) 'at its own
expense to defend any suit or action brought against [Peters] founded upon the
claim of such damage,... loss .... or theft.'" (brackets in original omitted)).
7. Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 187 P.3d 424, 431 (Cal. 2008)
("Finally, [Civil Code] section 2778, unchanged since 1872, sets forth general
rules for the interpretation of indemnity contracts, 'unless a contrary intention
appears.' If not forbidden by other, more specific statutes, the obligations set
forth in section 2778 thus are deemed included in every indemnity agreement
unless the parties indicate otherwise.").
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 437.
11. See infra Parts HI.A-B.
12. See infra Parts III.C-D.
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indemnitors."3
Part IV discusses the particular problems that Crawford
presents for design professionals,14 focusing on the differences
between coverage under designers' professional liability
insurance as opposed to the general liability insurance
generally relied upon by other parties in construction
projects. 5 Part V compares the defense duty recognized in
non-insurance agreements to the duties of an insurer and
concludes that, despite the court's statements to the contrary
concerning interpretation of insurance and non-insurance
agreements," Crawford imposes duties on indemnitors that
are at least as broad as those of an insurer. Part VI examines
the Crawford court's statements that (a) statutes limiting
indemnity agreements for residential projects and public
works mitigate the exposure of subcontractors and designers
to defense duties on such projects, 7 and that (b) the statute of
repose'8 will minimize their exposure under contracts that
predate those statutes. 9 Part VII contrasts the Crawford
court's vision of designers' ability to effectively understand
and negotiate indemnity agreements with the actual
capabilities and limitations of typical design businesses.0
Part VIII considers and rejects arguments that would
dismiss the statutory basis for imposing the defense duty as
dictum.' Finally, Part IX proposes alternative judicial and
13. See infra Part III.E & app. B.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part VI.A.
16. See infra Part V.
17. Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 187 P.3d 424, 440 (Cal. 2008)
(citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 2782(c)-(e) (2009)). The cited subdivisions address
only indemnification provided by "subcontractors" and do not mention design
professionals. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 2782(c)-(e). Whether the statute would
apply to a designer working under a subcontract to a general contractor or
builder is thus unclear. See id. For the purposes of this article, the author has
assumed that the statute applies to design professionals and the analysis in
Part VI explores the gaps that exist even with the statute's protection.
However, if the statute does not apply to design professionals, then designers
have even less protection against the imposition of liability for damages that
they did not cause.
18. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15 (2009).
19. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 440-41.
20. See infra Part VII.
21. See infra Part VIII. Although the agreement at issue in Crawford
contained strong language requiring the subcontractor to defend the developer
without regard to fault, the opinion views that language as "confirming" a
defense duty rather than establishing the basis for imposing a defense duty.
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legislative solutions for restoring the default defense duty
owed under non-insurance indemnity agreements to an
obligation that more closely matches parties' reasonable
expectations.22
II. CRAWFORD V. WEATHER SHIELD MANUFACTURING, INC.
AND INDEMNITY CONTRACTS IN CALIFORNIA
One court has defined indemnity as "the obligation
resting on one party to make good a loss or damage another
party has incurred." 3  In other words, under an indemnity
agreement, one party agrees to protect another by assuming
some liability that the other party might otherwise incur.
The party providing protection is the "indemnitor"; the
protected party is the "indemnitee"; and the act of providing
protection is "indemnification."4 Generally, an indemnity
promise specifies whether the indemnitor's duties extend to
protecting the other party from: (1) all liabilities, including
those caused by the indemnitee alone; (2) all liabilities,
including those caused in part by the indemnitee, but
excluding those caused solely by the indemnitee; or (3) only
those liabilities caused by the indemnitor.25
Absent an indemnity agreement, the common law may
impose a duty of indemnity: "[t]he duty to indemnify may
arise, and indemnity may be allowed in those fact situations
where in equity and good conscience the burden of the
judgment should be shifted from the shoulders of the person
seeking indemnity to the one from whom indemnity is
sought."26  This "equitable indemnity" doctrine stems from
the principle that everyone is responsible for the
consequences of his or her own wrongs-if others must pay
damages that a tortfeasor should have paid, they may then
recover from that tortfeasor."7 Following the adoption of
Crawford, 187 P.3d at 434.
22. See infra Part IX.
23. Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 532 P.2d 97, 100 (Cal. 1975)
(citing Sammer v. Ball, 12 Cal. App. 3d 607, 610 (Ct. App. 1970)).
24. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 837 (9th ed. 2009).
25. 5 B.E. WITKIN, WITKIN LEGAL INST., SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw §
119 (10th ed. 2005) (citing MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co., 105
Cal. Rptr. 725, 728-29 (Ct. App. 1972)).
26. Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74 (Ct. App. 1964).
27. Id.
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comparative fault principles in California, 8  equitable
indemnification has essentially held that anyone engaging in
tortious conduct is responsible to others for the consequences
of that conduct.29 When a person incurs costs in defending
him or herself against third-party claims caused by the
tortious conduct of others, equitable indemnity permits
recovery from the tortfeasors for these necessary defense
costs.
30
Although the indemnity agreement at issue in Crawford
imposed greater indemnity duties on the subcontractor than
would have applied under equitable indemnification
principles alone,3' it did not require the subcontractor to
indemnify the developer/builder if the subcontractor was
without fault.32 The court nonetheless held the subcontractor
liable for the developer's defense irrespective of fault under
the principle that such a duty exists under "every indemnity
contract, unless the agreement provides otherwise."33 This
duty, the court said, arises upon tender of defense by the
indemnitee if the claim contains allegations that, if proven,
28. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
29. Am. Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 912 (Cal. 1978)
(modifying California's equitable indemnity rule "to permit a concurrent
tortfeasor to obtain partial indemnity from other concurrent tortfeasors on a
comparative fault basis."). For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of
equitable indemnity in California, see 6 B.E. WITKIN, WITKIN LEGAL INST.,
SUMMARY OF CAL. LAW § 1357 (10th ed. 2005).
30. Under the doctrine of "tort of another," California law allows recovery of
defense costs when the party seeking the reimbursement (1) did not engage in
wrongful conduct of its own, (2) was sued for the wrongful conduct of the party
from whom it seeks indemnity, and (3) requested a defense from that party.
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.6 provides:
Upon motion, a court after reviewing the evidence in the principal case
may award attorney's fees to a person who prevails on a claim for
implied indemnity if the court finds (a) that the indemnitee through
the tort of the indemnitor has been required to act in the protection of
the indemnitee's interest by bringing an action against or defending an
action by a third person and (b) if that indemnitor was properly notified
of the demand to bring the action or provide the defense and did not
avail itself of the opportunity to do so, and (c) that the trier of fact
determined that the indemnitee was without fault in the principal case
which is the basis for the action in indemnity or that the indemnitee
had a final judgment entered in his or her favor granting a summary
judgment, a nonsuit, or a directed verdict.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.6 (2009).
31. Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 187 P.3d 424, 435 (Cal. 2008).
32. Id. at 428; see also § 1021.6.
33. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 434.
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would fall within the scope of the indemnity.'
A. The Trial Court Decision in Crawford
The underlying lawsuit in Crawford involved a
homeowner, Kirk Crawford, and other home buyers who sued
their subdivision's developer/contractor, J.M. Peters Co.
("Peters"), claiming a broad spectrum of construction defects,
including framing problems and window leakage.35 Peters
then filed cross-claims for indemnity against its various
subcontractors and design professionals.36 Along with its
indemnity cross-claims, Peters also requested that those
same subcontractors and designers defend Peters against the
homeowners' claims.37
The subcontracts contained a provision under which each
subcontractor/designer agreed:
[1] to indenify and save [Peters] harmless against all
claims for damages to persons or to property and claims
for loss, damage and/or theft of homeowner's personal
property growing out of the execution of the work, and [2]
at his own expense to defend any suit or action brought
against [Peters] founded upon the claim of such damage or
loss or theft....
Before trial, Peters settled with the homeowners, design
professionals, and all subcontractors except two: Darrow
Framing, and Weather Shield Manufacturing, Inc.." A jury
returned an approximately one million dollar verdict against
Darrow and exonerated Weather Shield of all fault. °
Because neither Darrow nor Weather Shield had provided
Peters's defense, the trial judge then conducted a bench trial
to determine their respective liabilities for Peters's cost to
defend against the homeowners' lawsuit.41 The judge held
both subcontractors jointly responsible for seventy percent-
the portion attributed to the alleged framing and window
34. Id.
35. Id. at 427-28.
36. Id. at 428.
37. Id. at 428 n.2.
38. Answer to Petition for Review at 3, Crawford, 187 P.3d 424 (No.
S141541) (quoting Paragraph 12 of the Developer/Weather Shield subcontract).
39. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 428.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 428-29.
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issues-of Peters's $375,069 defense costs, assessing half of
that amount against each cross-defendant.42 Weather Shield
appealed, arguing that it should have no liability for Peters's
defense because the jury had found it was without fault and
owed Peters nothing by way of indemnification.43
B. Is Crawford a Matter of Narrow Contract Interpretation?
Initially, in framing the issues before it, the Crawford
court characterized its opinion as a simple matter of contract
interpretation:
We consider whether, by their particular terms, the
provisions of a pre-2006 residential construction
subcontract obliged the subcontractor to defend its
indemnitee-the developer-builder of the project-in
lawsuits brought against both parties, insofar as the
plaintiffs' complaints alleged construction defects arising
from the subcontractor's negligence, even though (1) a jury
ultimately found that the subcontractor was not negligent,
and (2) the parties have accepted an interpretation of the
subcontract that gave the builder no right of indemnity
unless the subcontractor was negligent."
The court expressed its apparent intent to address the narrow
issue of how the subcontract's express terms should be
interpreted:
We granted review, limited to the following issue: Did a
contract under which a subcontractor agreed "to defend
any suit or action" against a developer "founded upon" any
claim "growing out of the execution of the work" require
the subcontractor to provide a defense to a suit against the
developer even if the subcontractor was not negligent?
45
Yet, despite its stated intent to undertake a contract-based
analysis of the defense clause, the court based its decision on
an analysis of the statute that governs interpretation of the
indemnity clause." Under a contract-based approach, a court
would likely begin with the language of the subcontract's
express defense clause and then examine whether any
42. Id. at 429.
43. See id. at 429-30.
44. Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
45. Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 187 P.3d 424, 429-30 (Cal. 2008)
(emphasis added).
46. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
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statute, the indemnification clause, or public policy prevented
its enforcement. 7 By contrast, a court undertaking a statute-
based approach would first determine the defense duty owed
under statutes governing interpretation of the indemnity
clause, and then determine whether an express defense
clause changed that duty.48
III. THE INDEMNITOR'S DEFENSE DUTY: SET BY STATUTE AND
QUALIFIED BY CONTRACT, OR SET BY CONTRACT AND
QUALIFIED BY STATUTE?
The Crawford court began its analysis by acknowledging
that parties have great freedom to define their relationship by
contract 49 and that "[w]hen the parties knowingly bargain for
the protection at issue, the protection should be afforded."0
Furthermore, parties may freely negotiate both indemnity
and defense terms" and may specify whether those
obligations apply with or without regard to the indemnitor's
negligence.52 Though the Crawford court initially framed the
issue as merely a matter of contractual interpretation, its
analysis centered instead on the defense duties arising under
California Civil Code section 2778."3 When the court finally
turned to the subcontract language itself, it focused on
whether the bargained-for defense obligation differed from
the statutory duties that it held otherwise exist in every
47. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 430-31 (discussing the rule of enforcing the
bargain negotiated by contracting parties, subject to statutory and public policy
considerations).
48. Id. at 431 (discussing the application of California Civil Code section
2778 to indemnity contracts). The terms "contract-based" and "statute-based"
do not appear in the decision, but are used in this article to describe the
alternative approaches for an analysis that involves both the statutes that
govern contract interpretation and the contract itself.
49. Id. at 430.
50. Id. (citing Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 532 P.3d 97, 104
(Cal. 1975)).
51. See id.
52. Id. (citing Heppler v. J.M. Peters Co., 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497, 508-09 (Ct.
App. 1999); Cont'l Heller Corp. v. Amtech Mech. Servs., Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d
668, 670-71 (Ct. App. 1997); Peter Culley & Assocs. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 624, 629 (Ct. App. 1992)).
53. Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 187 P.3d 424, 430-34 (Cal. 2008)
(discussing indemnity, pursuant to California Civil Code sections 2772 through
2778). The text of Civil Code section 2778 appears in Appendix A. Unless
otherwise indicated, all further unlabeled statutory references are to the
California Civil Code.
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indemnity contract.'
A. The Crawford Court Found a Default Defense Duty Within
Every Indemnity Agreement
The Crawford court noted that the freedom of parties to
allocate indemnity and defense obligations is subject to
certain prohibitions and limitations, none of which applied to
the Peters/Weather Shield subcontract.55 The court then
turned to section 2778 to determine the statutorily defined
defense duty owed to Peters under the subcontract's
indemnity clause. 6 Citing the statute, the court stated that
"'unless a contrary intention appears[,]' . . . obligations set
forth in section 2778 thus are deemed included in every
indemnity agreement."" After concluding that section 2778
establishes a default defense duty for every indemnitor, the
Crawford court thereafter examined the subcontract for
evidence of any contrary intent.58 This approach-implying a
duty to defend within every indemnity unless expressly
disclaimed by the contract-conflicts with the court's own
acknowledgement that parties should be free to contract as
they please and that judges should simply hold the parties to
their bargained-for agreement. 59
In delineating the defense obligations imposed by section
2778, the Crawford court noted "that a promise of indemnity
against claims, demands, or liability 'embraces the costs of
defense against such claims, demands, or liability' insofar as
such costs are incurred reasonably and in good faith."' It
further noted that indemnitors are "'bound, on request of the
[indemnitee], to defend actions or proceedings brought
against the [indemnitee] in respect to the matters embraced
by the indemnity,' though the indemnitee may choose to
conduct the defense."' 1
Before parsing section 2778, the Crawford court
concurred with the appellate court's observation that the
54. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 431-32.
55. See discussion infra Part III.B.
56. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 431.
57. Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778 (2009))
58. Id. at 434-35.
59. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
60. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 431 (citing § 2778(3)).
61. Id. (citing § 2778(4)).
20101 833
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Peters/Weather Shield subcontract included an unambiguous
promise by Weather Shield to defend any suit against Peters
that was "'founded upon' claims alleging damage or loss
arising from Weather Shield's [negligence]."'  Thus,
independent of any defense owed under the indemnity,
Weather Shield also had a contractual obligation to defend
such a suit, regardless of whether Weather Shield was later
determined to have been negligent.'
The Crawford court observed that an obligation to defend
differs from an obligation to reimburse for defense costs
following resolution of claims,' noting that the defense
"necessarily arises as soon as such claims are made against
the promisee, and may continue until they have been
resolved." While section 2778(3) states that a promise to
indemnify "embraces the costs of defense" against claims for
matters covered by the indemnity,' section 2778(4)
separately specifies the duty to provide the defense "upon the
indemnitee's request, [in] proceedings against the latter 'in
respect to the matters embraced by the indemnity. ' 1 7 The
court thus saw Peters's demand for defense as triggering a
separate and immediate defense obligation-a duty beyond
reimbursement for costs incurred in an indemnitee's
own defense.' Additionally, section 2778(4) requires an
indemnitor to defend its indemnitee in good faith upon tender
of the defense"-even if not expressly stated in the
contract.0
Drawing from prior decisions that had considered an
"indemnitor's duty to defend an indemnitee upon the latter's
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 432.
65. Id. at 431-32 (emphasis added).
66. See § 2778(3); Crawford, 187 P.3d at 432.
67. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 432 (quoting § 2778(4)).
68. See id. at 433-34 (citing Gribaldo, Jacobs, Jones & Assocs. v. Agrippina
Versicherunges A.G., 476 P.2d 406, 414 (Cal. 1970) (holding that, while an
"indemnitor is required to defend matters embraced by the indemnity if...
requested to do so by the indemnitee," the existence of a contrary intent in the
contract negated that duty)).
69. Id. at 432-33 (citing Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co.,
20 Cal. Rptr. 820, 828 (Ct. App. 1962)).
70. Id. at 433 (citing Buchalter v. Levin, 60 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373 (Ct. App.
1967)).
834 [Vol:50
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request,"71 the Crawford court concluded that subsection four
of section 2778 "places in every indemnity contract, unless the
agreement provides otherwise, a duty to assume the
indemnitee's defense, if tendered, against all claims
'embraced by the indemnity."'72 While an indemnitee may
seek to recover its defense costs following an indemnitor's
failure to defend a tendered claim, the claim is "nonetheless
distinct and separate from the contractual obligation to pay
an indemnitee's defense costs, after the fact, as part of any
indemnity owed under the agreement."
73
B. There Are Other Statutes that Limit Indemnity Agreements
in Cases Involving Residential Construction, Contracts with
Public Entities, and Instances of an Indemnitee's Sole
Negligence
The Crawford court recognized that other statutes limit
contractual indemnity in the context of design or construction
agreements.74 With regard to residential work performed
under contracts entered into after the statute went into effect,
section 2782 voids "any term in such a contract that obliges a
subcontractor to indemnify certain other project participants,
'including the cost to defend,' against construction defect
claims 'to the extent' the claims 'arise out of, pertain to, or
relate to' the negligence of those other entities."5 Similarly,
section 2782.8(a) prevents public entities from requiring
indemnification-expressly including defense costs-from
design professionals "except for claims that arise out of,
pertain to, or relate to the negligence, recklessness, or willful
misconduct of the design professional."76  These statutory
limits, however, do not apply outside the arenas of residential
71. See id. at 434; see also supra notes 50-52, 68-70 and accompanying
discussion.
72. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 434.
73. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778(3) (2009)).
74. Id. at 440.
75. Id. (citing § 2782(c)-(d), as added by Stats. 2005, ch. 394, § 1 and (e), as
added by Stats. 2007, ch. 32, § 1). It is notable that the language of this statute
bars only indemnity agreements that would require the indemnitor to
indemnify the developer/builder for its own negligence. It does not address a
situation such as that in Crawford, where the defense costs incurred by the
developer (and imposed fifty percent on Weather Shield) arose, according to the
jury, due thorough no negligence on the indemnitor's part. See generally id.
76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2782.8(a) (2009).
2010] 835
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construction or public works contracts,77 and they only cover
projects performed under relatively recent agreements. 8
Section 2782 also prohibits any party to a construction
agreement from requiring indemnification for that party's
own sole negligence or willful misconduct.79 This prohibition
provides the only statutory limit on indemnification cited by
the court that applies to commercial, industrial and other
private, non-residential design and construction projects.
C. Crawford's Rejection of a Narrow Defense Duty Raises the
Possibility that an Insurance-Like Defense Duty Exists in
Every Non-Insurance Indemnity Contract
In concluding its discussion of Weather Shield's liability
for Peters's defense costs, the Crawford court formally
disapproved of a case that had imposed a narrower
interpretation of section 2778.0 Weather Shield and its amici
curiae pointed to Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court81 to
argue that an indemnitor owed its indemnitee a defense only
to the same extent as its indemnification duty.82 Regan
Roofing concerned facts that were similar to those in
Crawford: construction defect claims by homeowners against
a developer and its subcontractors, and the developer's tender
of defense to its subcontractors.83 Upon the developer's
motion for summary judgment, the trial court in Regan
77. Id. § 2782(a); id. § 2782.8(a).
78. The limitations pertaining to residential work took effect for contracts
entered into starting January 1, 2006, and those pertaining to public projects
apply to contracts entered into starting January 1, 2007. See supra notes 75-76
and accompanying text.
79. See § 2782(a); see also id. § 1668.
80. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 439.
81. Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 413 (Ct. App.
1994), disapproved in part by Crawford, 187 P.3d at 439.
82. See Crawford, 187 P.3d at 438; see also Amicus Curiae Brief in Favor of
Defendant, Appellant and Petitioner Weather Shield Manufacturing Inc., by
The California Framing Contractor's Ass'n at 2, Crawford, 187 P.3d 424 (No.
S141541).
83. The contracts in Regan Roofing required the subcontractors to
indemnify and hold the developer harmless from "liability, cost or expense of any
nature or kind arising out of or in any way connected with Subcontractor's
performance, . . . save and except only such liability, cost or expense caused by
[the developer's] sole negligence or sole willful misconduct." Regan Roofing Co.,
29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 415. The subcontracts contained a defense clause similar to
that in the Peters/Weather Shield subcontract, requiring the subcontractor to
defend at its own expense "[in the event any suit on any claim is brought
against [the developer], subject to the [indemnity] provision." Id.
[Vol:50836
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Roofing agreed with the developer that the indemnity
provision included an enforceable duty to indemnify the
developer for its own negligence, but ruled that any
determination as to indemnity owed was premature because
the developer had yet to incur any judgment or settlement
payment.' In a manner similar to the Crawford court,
however, the trial judge held that section 2778 imposed a
defense duty that applied as soon as the developer tendered
its defense to the subcontractor and without regard to the
subcontractor's actual indemnity liability. 5
Regan Roofing Company appealed both the indemnity
enforceability and defense duty rulings.86 Though the Court
of Appeal agreed with the lower court's ruling as to
indemnity, 7 it reversed the finding that the subcontractor
had an immediate duty to defend the developer upon its
tender and without regard to the subcontractor's actual
indemnity liability.88
Fourteen years later in Crawford, the California
Supreme Court directly addressed Regan Roofing for the first
time89 and rejected its interpretation of section 2778. The
court reasoned that the Regan Roofing court assumed that,
84. Id. at 416.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 414. Regan Roofing Company also appealed on the ground that
the trial court's ruling was procedurally improper "because it [did] not
completely dispose of any cause of action or defense of the cross-complaint." Id.
Regan Roofing challenged the ruling on the substantive grounds that the trial
court (1) "improperly equated contractual indemnitors . . . with insurance
companies, thus improperly expanding the duty to defend"; and (2)
misconstrued the subcontract's indemnity clause. Id. Because the Court of
Appeal disposed of the case on the procedural grounds, it declined to reach the
substantive arguments. Id.
87. See id. at 419.
88. The Regan Roofing court explained:
Summary adjudication of the duty to defend and its relationship to the
duty to indemnify (i.e., the scope of "the matters embraced by the
indemnity") is premature. No determination has yet been made as to
whether the subcontractors were negligent in the performance of their
work, giving rise to a duty to indemnify and a related duty to defend.
[The developer] has not clearly established that under this indemnity
clause, the duty to defend against claims of liability is entirely free-
standing of the duty to indemnify for liability arising out of a
subcontractor's negligence.
Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778(4) (2009)).
89. A Westlaw Keycite "citing references" of Regan Roofing, conducted on
May 26, 2009, found no previous citation by the California Supreme Court to
the case. Appendix C summarizes the complete results of that Keycite.
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under section 2778(4) and unless the agreement at issue
clearly provided otherwise, an indemnitor's duty to defend
upon request is not "free-standing,"0 but extends only to
claims as to which indemnity is actually owed.91 To this, the
Crawford court responded:
[T]he duty to defend upon the indemnitee's request, as set
forth in subdivision 4 of section 2778, is distinct from, and
broader than, the duty expressed in subdivision 3 of the
statute to reimburse an indemnitee's defense costs as part
of any indemnity otherwise owed. Moreover, the
subcontracts at issue in Regan Roofing, like the one before
us here, did explicitly indicate a separate and distinct
duty to defend the indemnitee, at the indemnitor's own
cost and expense, against suits raising claims covered by
the indemnity. That duty-like Weather Shield's in this
case-necessarily arose when such a claim was made
against the indemnitee, and thus did not depend on
whether the conditions of indemnity were, or were not,
later established.92
The last two sentences quoted above appear to evidence
an intent by the Crawford court to base its decision on the
subcontract's specific, separate defense clause. But such a
narrow reading of the case would ignore the lengthy analysis
of section 2778 that preceded the quoted sentences.93 The
court read the subcontract's broad defense clause as
confirming that the parties had intended to bind the
subcontractor to the same defense duties that the court said
already existed under section 2778." In other words, rather
than expressing a "contrary intent," the defense clause in the
subcontract confirmed Weather Shield's obligation to provide
Peters precisely what the statute required: a defense
immediately upon tender, 95 and without regard to Weather
90. The Regan Roofing court used the term "free-standing" to describe a
defense obligation that is not tied to actual indemnity liability. Regan Roofing
Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 419.
91. Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 187 P.3d 424, 439 (Cal. 2008)
(quoting Reagan Roofing, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 419).
92. Id.
93. See id. at 431-38.
94. Id. at 434 ("Here, the subcontract at issue not only failed to limit or
exclude Weather Shield's duty 'to defend' [Peters], as otherwise provided by
subdivision 4 of section 2778, it confirmed this duty." (emphasis added)).
95. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778(4) (2009).
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Shield's actual liability under the indemnification clause."
D. Other Published Opinions, Both Before and After
Crawford, Provide Little Guidance on the Defense Duty Owed
Under Indemnity Agreements
While the Crawford court's disapproval of Regan Roofing
surprised many observers, it is not a departure for the
California Supreme Court. Rather, it appears that, through
Crawford, the court sought to correct what it viewed as a
mistake that could not otherwise be remedied.
Before Crawford, California's lower courts (and a few
non-California courts applying California law) cited Regan
Roofing fifty-seven times:97 thirty-two times in California
Court of Appeal decisions, eleven times in California trial
court opinions, twelve times in federal court opinions (ten in
California, and one each in Arizona and Texas), and one
opinion each from state trial courts in Maryland and
Vermont.98 Of the thirty-two California appellate decisions,
Westlaw classifies twenty-six as providing a "positive"
treatment of Regan Roofing, and characterizes only six as
providing "negative"9 treatment. The California Supreme
Court had never cited Regan Roofing before Crawford.1"'
Furthermore, many of the lower court opinions that
considered Regan Roofing never made it into the official
reports'o (leaving them generally uncitable as authority 2 ),
including eleven of the twenty-six appellate opinions giving it
96. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 435.
97. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. The total of thirty-two
appellate decisions does not include the 2006 Court of Appeal opinion in
Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787 (Ct. App. 2006),
which the Supreme Court decision supersedes. See infra app. C.
98. See infra app. C.
99. Id. As previously noted, the figure of six does not include the Crawford
Court of Appeal opinion.
100. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
101. See infra app. C.
102. The California Courts website explains that:
Rule 8.1115 (a), California Rules of Court, prohibits courts and parties
from citing or relying on any unpublished opinion in any action or
proceeding, except in limited circumstances specified by rule 8.1115 (b).
Availability of unpublished opinions on this Web site does not
constitute publication under California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105,
8.1110, 8.1115, or 8.1120.
California Courts: Unpublished Opinions of the Courts of Appeal,
httpJ/www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/nonpub.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2009).
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positive treatment, and three of the six negative opinions.
Another three positive treatments occur in "depublished"
10 3
opinions,"M including the intermediate-level decisions in
Crawford and one other case accepted for review by the
California Supreme Court. °5
California courts have not published any further
authority to interpret Crawford. As of the writing of this
article, California state and federal courts have cited
Crawford sixteen times1 0 -twice by the California Supreme
Court, eight times by California Courts of Appeal, and six
times in U.S. district court opinions.107 Neither of the
California Supreme Court cases referenced Crawford for its
treatment of the defense obligation, so those cases offer no
further guidance to lower courts. 108  Seven of the eight
103. A procedure unique to the state allows the California Supreme Court to
"depublish" lower court opinions:
California's unique procedure for the superseding and decertifying of
opinions, or "depublication" as it is more commonly known, causes a
great deal of confusion. The term "depublished" is commonly used to
refer to any case that appears in the official advance sheets but is
deleted from the official bound reports. Depublication is important
because, with limited exceptions, only opinions ordered officially
published can be cited as authority before the California courts
(California Rules of Court, rule 977).
Depublication of California Court of Appeal Decisions, CAL. L. SERIES (Hugh &
Hazel Darling Law Library, UCLA Sch. of Law Research Guide Series, L.A.,
Cal.), Apr. 2005, http://www.law.ucla.edu/docs/16226732005guidec6.pdf (citation
omitted) (bold omitted).
104. See infra app. C.
105. See infra app. C.
106. Westlaw Keycite, January 4, 2010. That Keycite search also reveals two
non-California courts that have cited Crawford: one Arizona appellate court and
the Nevada Supreme Court. In MT Builders, L.L.C. v. Fisher Roofing, Inc., 197
P.3d 758 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008), the Arizona Court of Appeal declined to follow
Crawford and did not impose a defense duty based on the indemnity promise
alone. The Nevada case, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Miller, 212 P.3d 318 (Nev. 2009),
concerned the duty to defend under an insurance contract, and only mentioned
Crawford for its observations regarding that duty. 212 P.3d at 324 (citing
Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 187 P.3d 424, 427 (Cal. 2008)).
107. See infra notes 109, 112 and accompanying text.
108. One California Supreme Court reference to Crawford concerns only the
principle that "noninsurance indemnity agreements [are] construed strictly
against [a] party seeking to be indemnified against its own negligence." Cable
Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 615 (Cal. 2008). The other
state Supreme Court case cites Crawford to make the point that "express
indemnity allows contracting parties 'great freedom to allocate [indemnification]
responsibilities as they see fit,' and to agree to 'protections beyond those
afforded by the doctrines of implied or equitable indemnity.'" Prince v. Pac. Gas
& Elec. Co., 202 P.3d 1115, 1120 (Cal. 2009) (noting that "Prince makes no
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appellate decisions that cited Crawford are not published-
although several contain extensive discussion of the defense
obligation owed under section 2778-while the single
published case cites Crawford for a matter unrelated to the
scope of defense duty.' 9
Finally, four of the six federal cases citing Crawford did
not directly address section 2778. In one, the issue of defense
duty was not before the court, because both parties had
conceded that under Crawford, "the duty to defend can be
triggered even if the party is not ultimately found to be
negligent.""0 Furthermore, the subcontractor in that case
successfully argued that "the duty to defend was never
triggered" because the plaintiff homeowner did not allege that
claim that PG&E expressly contracted to indemnify her for the type of damages
alleged here").
109. For the unpublished cases, see Gifted Schools v. Grahovac Constr. Co.,
No. D051905, 2009 WL 3864643, at *36-37 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2009)
(distinguishing Crawford because, in Gifted Schools, only the
contractor/indemnitee had alleged fault by the subcontractor/indemnitor, while
the plaintiff had not done so); Price Pfister, Inc. v. Trimas Corp., No. G039081,
2009 WL 249367, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2009) (following the Crawford
interpretation of California Civil Code section 2778 as imposing a separate duty
to defend and remanding the case for determination of which claims may have
triggered such duty); Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. Tyler Refrigeration, No. B202067,
2009 WL 223712, at *4-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2009) (following Crawford,
regarding broad duty to defend and focusing on whether the parties may, as
section 2778 allows, have agreed to limit the defense obligation); Bank of
America v. State, No. A118436, 2009 WL 62990, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 12,
2009) (citing Crawford for reasons unrelated to scope of defense obligation);
Aerospace Dynamics Intern., Inc. v. Frize Corp., Inc., No. B186725, 2008 WL
5096982, at *6 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2008) (distinguishing Crawford as only
addressing "the contractual duty to defend in a noninsurance context"); Reno
Metal Prods., Inc. v. Steiny & Co., Inc., No. B195871, 2008 WL 4457431, at *15-
16 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2008) (discussing the defense obligation in depth, but
distinguishing Crawford because the indemnitor in Reno Metal Products had
obtained a judgment against the indemnitee, and the court found it
incompatible to allow the indemnitee to recover its defense fees under those
circumstances); Bowers Companies, Inc. v. Benedict Canyon Prods., Inc., No.
B198384, 2008 WL 4255128, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2008) (citing
Crawford v. Weather Shield Manufacturing, Inc., 187 P.3d 424, 562 (Cal. 2008),
for principle unrelated to scope of defense obligation owed-"if one seeks
contractual indemnity protection for his own active negligence, the language
providing such protection must be particularly clear and explicit"). For the lone
published case, see Martin Bros. Constr., Inc. v. Thompson Pac. Constr., Inc.,
102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 430 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Crawford for principle that
"[u]nless the parties have indicated a special meaning, the contract's words are
to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense").
110. CEC Entm't, Inc. v. Kobra Props., No. 2:06-cv-639 JAM EFB, 2008 WL
4779576, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2008).
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the subcontractor's work had caused the particular problem
(roof leaks), for which the developer sought indemnification. 1 '
Three other U.S. district courts cited Crawford for purposes
unrelated to the issue of the defense duty."'
Only the last two federal cases citing Crawford engaged
in analysis of whether a defense duty existed under
Crawford. One court accepted Crawford's application of
section 2778, but denied a city/indemnitee's motion for partial
summary judgment that would have imposed defense liability
because the city failed to show that the plaintiffs claims fell
within the indemnification provision."' But in the other case,
the court allowed a contractor/developer to proceed against
two subcontractors on the issue of defense owed under an
indemnification, even while granting the subcontractors'
motions for summary judgment the underlying indemnity
claims under applicable statutes of limitations."4 While none
of these federal cases serve as binding precedent for
California's state courts, it appears that they read Crawford
to impose a broad, "free-standing" defense duty upon tender of
defense."5
111. Id. at *3-4.
112. See Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Access Claims Adm'rs, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 2d
1351, 1374-76 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (concerning the scope of the indemnity provision
itself and the conclusive effect of a settlement on establishing indemnity duty),
Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 946 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (stating the rules for interpreting contracts according to the plain
meaning of the words); Align Tech., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. C-08-04705 RMW,
2009 WL 4282098, *13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009) (detailing the duty to
indemnify owed by an insurer to its insured).
113. McIntosh v. N. Cal. Universal Enter., Inc., No. CV F 07-1080 LJO GSA,
2009 WL 3489417, *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct 26, 2009).
114. See Centex Homes v. Fin. Pac. Ins. Co., No. CV F e AWI SMS, 2009 WL
5030138, *8-10 (E.D. Cal. Dec 16, 2009) [hereinafter Centex 1]; Centex Homes v.
Fin. Pac. Ins. Co., No. CV F 07-00568 AWl SMS, 2009 WL 5030139, *8 (E.D.
Cal. Dec 16, 2009) [hereinafter Centex II].
115. Writing about the defense duty owed under a contract for indemnity, the
Eastern District of California, stated:
[Tihe potential existence of a class of damages that may not be within
the scope of indemnity costs, combined with Centex's claim for damages
arising from those costs, is sufficient to create an issue of material fact
that will require resolution either by the finder of fact or by subsequent
motion for summary judgment.
Centex 1, 2009 WL 5030138, at *8; Centex 11, 2009 WL 5030139, at *9.
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E. Crawford's Implications May Extend Beyond Design and
Construction, and Potentially Beyond California
Although the Crawford holding arose in the context of a
construction dispute in California, it may have a far greater
reach. The court based its decision upon a statute that
applies to every indemnity agreement,"6 and it did not limit
its opinion to the design and construction fields. Also, the
California statute at issue comes directly from the Field
Code,17 which has influenced the laws of many other states
since the mid-nineteenth century. '18 Four other states retain
the same Field Code language found in the California's
section 2778."9 Furthermore, as discussed in Appendix B,
statutes and case law from other states suggests that courts
in other jurisdictions could find a similar, independent
defense obligation lurking within every indemnity
agreement."'
IV. CRAWFORD PRESENTS UNINSURABLE RISKS FOR DESIGN
PROFESSIONALS
A. Given the Differences Between General Liability and
Professional Liability Insurance Policies, Crawford Will
Create Particular Problems for Designers
Crawford has particularly grave implications for design
professionals because of the differences between professional
liability insurance, which provides designers with the
116. Section 2778 begins with the following sentence: "In the interpretation
of a contract of indemnity, the following rules are to be applied, unless a
contrary intention appears." CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778 (2009); see also infra app. A
(including the complete text of the statute).
117. David Dudley Field's codification of New York laws formed the basis for
California's 1872 Civil, Criminal, and Political Codes, and a revised Code of
Civil Procedure. Lewis Grossman, Codification and the California Mentality, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 617, 617 (1994).
118. Aniceto Masferrer, The Passionate Discussion Among Common Lawyers
about Postbellum American Codification: An Approach to Its Legal
Argumentation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173, 176 n.19 (2008).
119. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778 (2009); see also MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-11-313 to
28-11-317 (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 22-02-07 (2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §
427 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 56-3-11 to 56-3-15 (2009).
120. Appendix B includes citations to cases imposing a defense liability
independent of actual indemnity liability under varying contractual situations
in decisions from courts in Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin. See infra app. B.
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coverage typically excluded from their general insurance, and
the general liability coverage relied upon by owners,
contractors and subcontractors. 121 In design and construction
matters, parties primarily rely on one of those two types of
insurance to cover damages caused by their negligence. 2
For parties other than design professionals, general liability
insurance (GL) covers most damages caused by the negligence
of the insured parties.2 ' A typical GL policy allows a
policyholder to list other parties as "additional insureds," and
can be endorsed to cover contractually-assumed liability in
addition to ordinary negligence by the insured.
2 1
As a rule, however, GL policies have endorsements that
exclude coverage for any liability arising from the rendering
of "professional services," such as engineering or
architecture. 125  Even the professional liability coverage
available as an addition to contractors' GL policies typically
covers only bodily injury and property damage (not economic
loss), and generally will cover only design work incidental to
121. See PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O'CONNOR, JR., BRUNER &
O'CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 11:123 (2009) ("Professional liability
coverage: Introduction-Insurance coverage for design-build projects.").
122. '[Professional liability insurance] offers design professionals a form of
protection against the risks inherent in professional practice, and affords
coverage for claims made arising out of actual or alleged negligent acts, errors,
or omissions in the performance of professional services." KEVIN R. SIDO,
ARCHITECT AND ENGINEER LIABILITY: CLAIMS AGAINST DESIGN PROFESSIONALS
45 (2006).
123. Id.; see also FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSTRUCTION LAW (Carina Y. Enhada,
Cheri Turnage Gatlin, Fred D. Wilshusen eds., 2001) ("Most of the [contractor's
insurance] coverages under AIA Document A201 are provided under policies
known as commercial general liability ('CGL') policies.").
124. COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY OCCURRENCE FORM (2005),
http:/www.chartisinsurance.com/ncglobalweb/internet(US/en/files/specLEXG
L%200ccurrence%2OForm%20-%20LX%209641%20(ed%2E%2010-05)_tcm295-
8807.pdf [hereinafter GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY] (removing exclusion for
"insured contracts"). In the author's experience, such provisions are typical of
commercial general liability insurance policies. It is not within the scope of this
article to present a detailed comparison of the different types of insurance, nor
additional insured coverage issues.
125. Id. at 15-16 (excluding from the definition of an "insured contract" any
part of the contract "[u]nder which the insured, if an architect, engineer or
surveyor, assumes liability for an injury or damage arising out of the insured's
rendering or failure to render professional services, including those listed in (2)
above and supervisory, inspection, architectural or engineering activities"); see
also BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 121, § 11:118 ("Professional liability
coverage: Introduction."); id. § 11:119 ("Professional liability coverage:
Introduction - Scope of 'professional services' exclusion.").
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the construction process, not complete project design
* 126
services. While a design professional may have GL
insurance, such a policy would offer little protection for
claims regarding professional engineering or architectural
services because of the exclusion.127 Therefore, professional
liability insurance (PL) provides the most important coverage
for design professionals in any claim involving their
services. 121
The Crawford decision creates particular problems for
designers because of one key difference between PL and GL
insurance-the exclusion of contractually-assumed liability
from coverage under PL policies.'29  Under equitable
indemnity principles, a person must indemnify others for
damages caused by his or her own negligence.' In
California, the costs that such other persons incur to defend
themselves against third-party claims caused by a tortfeasor's
negligence are reimbursable as damages that they can claim
against the tortfeasor."'2 This responsibility for defense costs
126. GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY, supra note 124; see also BRUNER &
O'CONNOR, supra note 121, § 11:123 ("Professional liability coverage:
Introduction-Insurance coverage for design-build projects.").
127. BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 121, § 11:119.
128. See id. at § 11:7 ("Standardization of policy language-How standard
forms provide differing coverages to differently situated insureds.... Because
most of the design professional's liability exposures in connection with any
particular construction project arise out of the performance of its professional
services, it is the professional liability policy that provides the greatest
insurance coverage to architects and engineers.").
129. See, e.g., CNA INS., PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND POLLUTION INCIDENT
LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY 8 (2005), http'//www.schinnerer.com/industries/
design-firms/Documents/PolicyForms/AEC-2005-Main-Policy.pdf [hereinafter
CNA-PL Policy] (detailing IV(B) exclusions arising out of liability assumed
under any oral or written agreement, excepting liability that would exist even
without the contractual assumption).
130. See supra note 30 (discussing liability for defense costs under "tort of
another" doctrine); see also WITKIN, supra note 25, § 115 ("The right depends
upon the principle that everyone is responsible for the consequences of his own
wrong, and if others have been compelled to pay damages which ought to have
been paid by the wrongdoer, they may recover from him." (citing Herrero v.
Atkinson, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (Ct. App. 1964)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
131. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also John E. Branagh &
Sons v. Witcosky, 51 Cal. Rptr. 844 (Ct. App. 1966). The court upheld a cross-
defendant's liability under an indemnity agreement for cross-complainant's cost
to defend itself from a third party action caused by the cross-defendant's fault.
See id. The indemnity at issue provided protection "from any and all loss,
damage, liability, claim, demand, suit or cause of action" and the opinion does
not mention any contractual term regarding either attorneys fees or a defense
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matches an indemnitor's responsibility under section 2778(3):
the reimbursement of an indemnitee's defense costs incurred
as a result of-and proportionate with-matters embraced
by the indemnity.3 ' Until the California Supreme Court
rejected Regan Roofing in Crawford,3' determination of an
indemnitor's liability for defense costs was premature until
the court knew the indemnitor's liability on the underlying
indemnification." The only exception occurred when the
contract provided that the duty to defend against claims of
liability was independent of the duty to indemnify for liability
arising out of the indemnitor's negligence."
35
Prior to Crawford and absent other specific defense
provisions, the extent of an indemnitor's defense duties under
an indemnity contract thus mirrored the extent of its
indemnity duties."16  If a designer's indemnity duties
remained within what its PL insurance covered (damages
caused by the designer's negligence),"17 then its defense
duties -reimbursement of defense costs caused by that
negligence-would similarly stay within that coverage."18 But
under Crawford, an indemnitor has a presumed defense
obligation for matters allegedly embraced by the indemnity,
139
regardless of ultimate indemnity liability, unless expressly
disclaimed." ° It is likely that PL insurance carriers will
decline coverage for a statutorily implied defense duty
imposed on designers under a contractual indemnity, except
to the extent that it would have existed under common law
equitable indemnity. And for claims relating to the
duty. Id. at 845.
132. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778(3) (2009).
133. Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 187 P.3d 424, 439 (Cal. 2008).
134. See Reagan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 413, 419 (Ct.
App. 1994).
135. Id.
136. Id. (noting that the duty to defend could not be known until one knew
the extent of the actual indemnity duty).
137. CNA-PL Policy, supra note 129, at 2 (examining I(A), which provides
coverage for "all amounts in excess of the Deductible up to the Limit of Liability
that you become legally obligated to pay as a result of: 1. a [tortious] act")
138. Id. If the designer is held liable for only for the claimant's defense costs
necessitated by the designer's negligence, those costs are part of the claimant's
damages. See Crawford, 187 P.3d at 429.
139. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 434.
140. Id.
141. See CNA-PL Policy, supra note 129, at 8 (examining IV(B), which
excludes contractually-assumed liability).
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designer's professional services, its GL insurance carrier also
will not cover the exposure because of the professional
services exclusion standard in GL policies.14 ' Thus, unless an
indemnity clause expressly limits the defense duty to the
same scope as that which exists under section 2778(3), it
creates for designers an uninsured duty to defend the
indemnitee without regard to the designer's fault 1-even if
the indemnity makes no mention of "defense," and even if the
indemnification applies only to the extent of the designer's
negligence.'"
B. Crawford Creates Unexpected, Uninsured Risks in Mutual
Indemnity Agreements Between Design Professionals
When a contract between two designers provides for
mutual indemnification, Crawford creates a particularly
interesting-and disturbing-situation. Such provisions,
common in agreements between prime consultants and their
sub-consultants, 5 can leave both firms exposed to the other's
defense costs without limit as a result of the defense duty
recognized in Crawford." 6  At the same time, as discussed
below, such provisions may relieve the designers' respective
insurers of any exposure to the defense cost of their own
insureds.
Consider the following typical mutual indemnity
provision:
Prime Consultant and Subconsultant agree that each of
them, as Indemnitor, will indemnify and hold the other
142. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
143. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 434 (declaring that a defense duty exists
independent of actual liability under the indemnity provision unless the parties
provide otherwise).
144. Id. The court states that the provision exists in every indemnity
agreement, not every indemnity and defense agreement, and it never says that
the indemnity agreement needs to make any reference to defense. Id.
Accordingly, any limitation on the scope of indemnification would not affect the
scope of defense duty owed unless the provision expressed an intent to have a
different defense obligation apply.
145. Professional liability insurance companies generally recommend that
design professionals propose mutual indemnification provisions, both to their
clients and in subconsulting agreements. Telephone interview with Lisa
Gamblin, Vice President for Claims & Risk Mgmt., Terra Ins. Co. (May 6, 2009).
Ms. Gamblin formerly served as Western U.S. Claims Manager for XL Design
Professional.
146. See supra Part III.A.
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harmless, as Indemnitee, from all liability, claims, losses,
damages and expenses incurred by Indemnitee, but only
to the extent such liability, claims, losses, damages and
expenses are caused by Indemnitor's negligence.
4 7
This provision confirms that each party will provide the other
with the same scope of indemnity protection as exists under
common law principles. As such, it amounts to a mutual
affirmation of good faith and fairness, and seemingly confirms
that the parties do not intend to change their common law
obligations. 4 1 Yet now, under Crawford, each party also
owes the other a defense for any claim alleging the party's
negligence.'49 This duty arises upon tender and without
regard to actual liability, and is different from the
reimbursement duty that the parties would each owe to the
other under equitable indemnity principles.5 0
While the PL insurers would remain responsible for
indemnity payments regarding any damages caused by their
respective insureds, 5' the mutual indemnity will allow them
to escape all liability for defense costs. Because each party
owes the other a defense, the insurers can both insist that
their respective insureds each tender their defense to the
other party.'52 Yet when they do, the insurers can each
refuse to pay for the defense of the other party, because that
defense duty exists only as a consequence of the indemnity
contract-and no coverage exists for contractually based
obligations.'53  This relieves the insurers of all defense
liability for either party because, while the insurers would
have to defend their respective insureds when the parties
refuse to pay for each other's defense, each insurer could later
subrogate against the other party to recover those defense
147. This is the mutual indemnity language recommended by the author to
design professionals during his tenure as vice president for claims management
and loss prevention with Terra Insurance Company from June 2003 through
March 2008. Similar language is recommended by most professional liability
carriers. Telephone interview with Lisa Gamblin, supra note 145.
148. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
149. See supra Part III.A.
150. See supra Part III.A.
151. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
152. The CNA-PL Policy states: "If any of you have rights to recover amounts
from another, those rights are transferred to us to the extent of our payment."
CNA-PL Policy, supra note 129, at 14 (bold omitted).
153. Id. at 8 (focusing on IV(B)).
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costs without regard to any actual indemnity liability.TM
Furthermore, because the subrogation actions would involve
only the contractual liability for defense costs, neither design
professional would have coverage for their defense against
the claims of the other party's insurer in the subrogation
actions.
Ironically, although it only restates each party's common
law equitable indemnity obligation that applies absent an
indemnity provision,"5 the seemingly fair, "mutual indemnity"
actually creates a mutual uninsured exposure for both
designers. Indeed, this uninsured exposure involves costs
that each designer would have had covered by its own
insurer, except that the other party now has a contractually-
assumed (and uninsured) obligation to pay those costs. 156
After Crawford, parties can avoid this harsh consequence
only if they specifically disclaim any defense duty beyond the
reimbursement duty owed under section 2778(3)."5
V. UNDER CRAWFORD, AN INDEMNITOR'S DEFENSE DUTY
RESEMBLES THE DUTY OF AN INSURER
From the outset, the Crawford court stated that a clear
distinction exists between indemnity agreements in insurance
policies and those contained in non-insurance contracts.
158
The court observed that the law treats insurance and non-
insurance agreements differently, with the former construed
in favor of the insured because insurers generally
enjoy superior bargaining power."' By contrast, because
indemnitees often have the greater power in non-insurance
contract negotiations, public policy favors greater scrutiny of
indemnity agreements, and disfavors enforcing indemnity
promises in some situations.6 ° Thus, the Crawford court
stated that outside of the insurance context any promise to
provide indemnification beyond the obligations imposed
154. CNA-PL Policy supra note 152, at 14.
155. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
156. See supra Part III.A.
157. See supra Part III.A.
158. See Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 187 P.3d 424, 427 (Cal.
2008).
159. Id. at 430.
160. Id. (citing Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 396 P.2d 377, 382 (Cal.
1964); Reagan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 413, 419 (Ct. App.
1994)).
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under common law equitable indemnity must be "particularly
clear and explicit, and will be construed strictly against the
indemnitee." 1 1 And, it noted, statutes prevent indemnifying a
party for its own sole negligence or willful misconduct.162
Despite the court's statements about the different scopes
of indemnity in insurance and non-insurance agreements,'63
Crawford turns that distinction on its head with regard to the
defense owed under indemnity agreements in those contexts.
At first, the Crawford court professed to agree that insurers
owe their insureds a greater defense obligation than a non-
insurance indemnitor owes to its indemnitee.'" Yet the
court's analysis results in finding a default defense obligation
in every indemnity agreement that extends to any claim
potentially embraced by the indemnity, absent language to
the contrary."6 That obligation mirrors the defense duty of an
insurer: a duty to defend the insured from any claim against
the insured that might, if proven, fall within the insurance
policy.166  Indeed, the defense obligation owed to an
indemnitee under Crawford arguably encompasses a duty
even broader in some respects than that owed by an insurer
to its insured, as discussed below.
An insurer must defend its insured from any claim, even
groundless ones, so long as the claim alleges liability for
matters covered by the policy.6 7 Similarly, Crawford holds
that, unless the parties expressly agreed otherwise, an
161. Id. at 431.
162. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1668, 2782(a) (2009)). For further
discussion, see supra Part III.B.
163. In the court's words:
"[While] indemnity agreements resemble liability insurance policies,
rules for interpreting the two classes of contracts do differ significantly.
Ambiguities in a policy of insurance are construed against the insurer,
who generally drafted the policy, and who has received premiums to
provide the agreed protection. In noninsurance contexts, however, it is
the indemnitee who may often have the superior bargaining power, and
who may use this power unfairly to shift to another a disproportionate
share of the financial consequences of its own legal fault."
Id. at 430 (citations omitted).
164. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 430.
165. See supra Part III.A.
166. CNA-PL Policy, supra note 129, at 2 ("We have the right and duty to
defend any claim against you seeking amounts that are payable under the
terms of this Policy, even if any of the allegations of the claim are groundless,
false, or fraudulent.") (bold omitted).
167. Id.
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indemnitor must defend its indemnitee for any tendered
claim-without regard to ultimate indemnification
liability-provided that the claim against the indemnitee
contains allegations that the indemnification would embrace
if proven." Therefore, unless a different intent appears in
the agreement, the defense duty owed for any claim tendered
under the indemnity169 is at least as broad as the duty an
insurer owes its insured. 7 '
If an insured conducts its own defense after the insurer
wrongly denies defense, a good faith settlement or judgment
is presumptive evidence against the insurer.'' In such cases,
the insured may also recover its defense costs from the
insurer.' This right to recover defense costs exists even for
claims ultimately determined not to be covered by the policy
and without regard to the insured's ultimate liability.'73
However, an insurer's refusal to defend does not result in any
liability greater than the policy limit.'74
Similarly, unless the parties expressly agreed otherwise,
Crawford stands for the principle that a non-insurance
indemnity agreement allows an indemnitee to recover its
defense costs from the indemnitor without regard to the
indemnitor's actual fault.'75  And, when an indemnitor
168. See supra Part III.A.
169. See supra Part III.A.
170. See supra note 166.
171. See 39A CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts § 554 (2006) [hereinafter CAL.
JUR. 3D].
172. Id.
173. "The general measure of damages for a breach of the duty to defend an
insured, even if it is ultimately determined there is no coverage under the
policy, are the costs and attorney fees expended by the insured defending the
underlying action." Emerald Bay Cmty. Ass'n v. Golden Eagle Ins. Corp., 31
Cal. Rptr. 3d 43, 52 (Ct. App. 2005).
174. See CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 171, § 555. "While the insurer may be
liable for amounts over the policy limit because of its wrongful refusal to settle
the underlying action, the liability of an insurer for failure to defend is
ordinarily limited to the amount of the policy plus attorneys' fees and costs." Id.
(citing Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass'n v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 219 F.3d
895 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying California law)).
175. "[U]nless the parties' agreement expressly provides otherwise, a
contractual indemnitor has the obligation, upon proper tender by the
indemnitee, to accept and assume the indemnitee's active defense against
claims encompassed by the indemnity provision." Crawford v. Weather Shield
Mfg., Inc., 187 P.3d 424, 432 (Cal. 2008). And:
the duty to defend an indemnitee against all claims "embraced by the
indemnity"... arises immediately upon a proper tender of defense by
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refuses to defend its indemnitee and the indemnitee conducts
its own defense and settlement (or incurs a judgment), the
results of those efforts are conclusive against the
indemnitor.'76 Thus, an indemnitor's refusal to accept an
indemnitee's tender has essentially the same effect as an
insurer's refusal to defend its insured.
Furthermore, the liability of an indemnitor that accepts a
defense tender-unlike that of a PL insurer defending its
insured-exists without limit, unless the contract places a
limitation on such liability. This is similar to the exposure a
GL carrier has for defense of its insured, because defense
costs typically do not erode a GL policy's limits.177 In contrast,
PL policies are often referred to as "wasting' policies, because
policy limits include defense costs. 78 A PL insurer thus has a
cap on its exposure for the combined defense and indemnity
costs-even when an insurer refuses to defend its insured
from a claim, its exposure remains capped by its policy
limit.179 By contrast, Crawford exposes a design professional
indemnitor to potentially unlimited defense cost liability.1
80
And finally, an indemnitor faces a potentially greater
exposure than an insurer when the tender of defense occurs
after a delay. An insured that fails to tender its defense to its
insurer may lose its entire protection under the policy-both
for defense and indemnity.' If the insured fails to comply
the indemnitee, and thus before the litigation to be defended has
determined whether indemnity is actually owed. This duty, as
described in the statute, therefore cannot depend on the outcome of
that litigation.
Id. at 434.
176. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778(5) (2009).
177. GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY, supra note 124, at 11-12.
"SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS" concludes with the notation regarding
payment for the insured's defense: "These payments will not reduce the limits of
insurance." Id.
178. CNA-PL Policy, supra note 129, at 10 (noting that V(A)(4) states that
"[c]laim expenses are subject to and included within the applicable Limit of
Liability").
179. See id.
180. This should not be confused with the unlimited exposure that an insurer
may face if it refuses to settle a case within policy limits, and thereby exposes its
insured to an excess of policy limits judgment. Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d
173 (Cal. 1967).
181. Under the terms of PL insurance, the insured must provide the insurer
with proper notice of the claim in order to have coverage. See CNA-PL Policy,
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with a policy's notice and tender requirements, the insurer
may not even need to show prejudice to escape any further
obligations under the policy for both defense and indemnity,
depending on the jurisdiction.'82 Meanwhile, an indemnitee
that chooses to provide its own defense may still seek
indemnification upon incurring liability to a third party, to
the extent that the liability falls within the agreed scope of
indemnity."' Furthermore, an indemnitee's failure to tender
its defense to the indemnitor does not bar the indemnitee
from later recovering a reimbursement of defense costs
incurred to the extent of claims for which the indemnitor has
indemnity liability."
Thus, if an indemnitee fails to tender its defense, the
most that the indemnitee might lose is the cost of defense
beyond those costs incurred due to matters for which the
indemnitor has an actual indemnification obligation. And
any third party's settlement or judgment against an
indemnitee provides presumptive evidence against the
indemnitor as to the indemnitee's liability-albeit not
conclusive evidence, as it would have been had the
indemnitee tendered its defense.'85 Thus, compared to a non-
insurance indemnitor, a professional liability insurer may
have less exposure to defense costs in the context of a late
tendered claim.
supra note 129, at 2 (stating that I.B requires reporting of the claim to the
insurer); id. at 10 (stating that IV(K)(1) limits coverage to only claims for which
the insured has provided notice to the insurer).
182. California Jurisprudence states:
Commonly, "claims made" policies require not only that the underlying
claim be made against the insured within the specified period, but that
the insured give notice of the claim to the insured within that same
period, or within a specified extended period. The notice-prejudice rule,
which prevents an insurer from denying coverage for breach of the
policy's notice requirements unless it can show actual prejudice from
the delay, does not apply to "claims made" policies, because that type of
policy makes notice an element of coverage.
CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 171, § 443 (citing Homestead Ins. Co. v. Am. Empire
Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268 (Ct. App. 1996)).
183. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778(4) (2009).
184. Watsonville v. Corrigan, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 458 (Ct. App. 2007)
(interpreting section 2778 to allow the City indemnitee to recover
reimbursement for its defense costs under an indemnity agreement, even
though the City had not tendered its defense to the developer indemnitor since
the contract in question did not require such tender).
185. Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 187 P.3d 424, 432 n.6 (Cal.
2008).
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VI. OTHER STATUTES ONLY PARTIALLY MITIGATE CRAWFORD'S
EFFECT
After declaring a rule that will, in effect, insert an
insurance-like, default defense obligation into every non-
insurance indemnity agreement,"' the Crawford court tried to
down-play the rule's likely impact on contracting parties. 18
7
The court acknowledged but dismissed a number of concerns
raised by Weather Shield and other amicus participants."
These concerns included: the disparate bargaining power
between most contractors and their subcontractors, a lack of
compensation for subcontractors' added risk exposure, the
concern that relieving developers and builders of defense
costs discourages them from exercising appropriate care,
small subcontractors' lack of adequate resources to fund the
"up-front" defense of developers and builders, the fact that
developers and builders typically have interests adverse to
those of the subcontractors asked to provide their defense, the
inability of most subcontractors to benefit from the more
favorable legal rates available to large developers and
builders, subcontractors' frequent lack of access to developers'
attorney billing records, and a fear that insurers will leave
the California market. 189
The Crawford court professed its sensitivity to these
policy issues,' 90 but dismissed them. In rejecting these
concerns, it pointed to recent legislation that has addressed
many of the issues in the contexts of residential and public
construction projects. 9' It did not mention, however, that
this legislation fails to address private, non-residential design
186. See Parts III.C, V.
187. See Crawford, 187 P.3d at 439-41.
188. Id.
189. Id.; see also id. at 440 n.13 (noting, without any basis, that the court
"[does] not dismiss the possibility that in many instances, subcontractors may
prefer to assume, and control, the defense of suits against builders, developers,
or other contractors, especially when the claims raised may expose the
subcontractors themselves to direct or indirect liability"). In the author's
experience, most construction disputes place developer/builders and their
subcontractors in adverse positions, with each pointing the finger of blame at
the other for the plaintiffs claims. Accordingly, it would be extremely rare for a
subcontractor or design professional to "prefer to assume, and control" the
developer/builder's defense in good faith.
190. Id. at 441.
191. Id. at 440 (citing CAL. CIv. CODE § 2782 (2009) for residential projects
and CAL. CIV. CODE § 2782.8 (2009) for public projects).
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and construction projects. Furthermore, as the court
concedes, the residential and public project limitations affect
only projects performed under contracts entered into after
January 1, 2006 (residential construction) 192 or January 1,
2007 (public works).'93 Thus, residential and public projects
subject to agreements in existence before these dates also
remain unaffected by the limitations. T' Then, with no further
attention to the concerns raised in Weather Shield's favor, the
court summarily declared: "Nonetheless, for reasons stated at
length above, we decline the holding [Weather Shield and its
amici curiae] propose."95
In discussing the arguments of Weather Shield and its
supporting amici curiae, the opinion also appears to accept
that California's statute of repose"' over time will mitigate
the risks posed by older projects and, presumably, those
posed by non-residential private work.9 7 But the statute of
repose does not bar all design and construction claims after
ten years; rather, it applies to only to claims for damage to
real or personal property caused by undiscovered, "latent"
defects, and it does not apply to any claim of bodily injury or
death.19 In addition, large projects can take many years to
design and construct,"' so that many designers and
subcontractors are even now working under pre-2006 or pre-
2007 contracts, and will continue to working under those
agreements for years to come.2°" Because the ten-year period
192. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2782.
193. § 2782.8.
194. See supra notes 114-15, 192-93 and accompanying discussion.
195. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 440. This presumably refers to the lengthy
analysis of the defense duty under California Civil Code section 2778, although
the court did not specifically identify the antecedent intended by its reference to
"the reasons stated at length above."
196. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15 (2009). The court refers to this as a
"statute of limitations." See Crawford, 187 P.3d at 440. The distinction
between statutes of limitations and repose is not relevant to this article.
197. See Crawford, 187 P.3d at 440. The court states: "However, Weather
Shield and its amici curiae assert that, unless we hold otherwise, California's
[ten]-year statute of limitations for construction defects (Code Civ. Proc. §
337.15) still exposes numerous subcontractors who signed earlier agreements to
unfair and burdensome defense demands by developers." Id. at 440 (emphasis
omitted).
198. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15(a)(2).
199. Telephone interview with James Withiam, President of D'Appolonia
Eng'g, Pittsburgh, Pa. (May 13, 2009).
200. Telephone interview with David L. Coduto, President of Terra Ins. Co.
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does not begin to run on a project until its substantial
completion,"' the repose period may not commence on some
current projects until years from now.
Even when the statute of repose applies to an indemnity
claim, it may not negate the defense obligation owed under an
indemnity provision. The statute of repose is a defense to
indemnity liability, but the default defense duty under an
indemnity articulated in Crawford does not depend on actual
indemnification liability.20 2 Weather Shield's duty to defend
Peters existed without regard to the defenses Weather Shield
had to indemnity liability. 2°3 As a result, the fact that
Weather Shield eventually obtained a defense verdict did not
negate its duty to defend Peters prior to obtaining that
judgment. °4
Similarly, it is possible that the statute of repose would
not relieve an indemnitor of its obligation to defend an
indemnitee before the indemnitor conclusively establishes
that it has no liability under the indemnity agreement. A
defense based on the statute of repose could be viewed as
comparable to Weather Shield's "no-negligence" defense to
Peters's cross-claim. But the mere possibility that an
indemnitor may have a complete defense to its indemnity
liability does not negate the defense duty recognized by
Crawford.2"2 Thus, a statute of repose defense on the issue of
indemnity might not relieve an indemnitor of its defense duty,
just as Weather Shield's innocence defense under the
indemnity did not affect its obligation to defend Peters.
(May 5, 2009).
201. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15(a).
202. See supra Part III.C.
203. See supra Part III.C.
204. The Crawford court states:
We do not suggest that the indemnitor's duty to defend would continue
even if, during the progress of the third party proceeding against the
indemnitee, all claims potentially subject to the contractual indemnity
obligation were eliminated, or if the promisor otherwise conclusively
established that the claims were not among those "embraced by the
indemnity." Such issues are not before us, and we express no views
thereon.
Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 187 P.3d 424, 434 n.7 (Cal. 2008)
(citation omitted). Note that the last sentence leaves the door open for the court
to someday find that the defense duty could continue even after the indemnitor
establishes it does not have any indemnity duty.
205. Id.; see also supra Part III.A; supra notes 114-15 and accompanying
discussion
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The risk of claims beyond the ten-year period is not
remote. As noted above, the statute of repose does not apply
to bodily injury claims.26  Nor does it apply where the
indemnified party-such as an owner or lessor, as opposed to
a contractor or developer-has actual possession of the
property. 2°7 Although the statute bars owners from asserting
indemnity claims against their contractors, subcontractors, or
designers after the ten-year period,0 8 it does not address an
owner's right to demand that an indemnitor defend it from
claims involving matters for which indemnity would have
applied. Even if courts hold that the statute of repose applies
to defense tenders, as well as indemnity claims, an
indemnitor could still find itself liable for defense costs
incurred until the time when it conclusively proves it has no
duty to indemnify.2 9
Finally, opinions in a federal case suggests that the
defense duty under an indemnity will not be subject to the
same statute of repose that applies to construction defect
claims. In separate rulings on a developer's claims against
two subcontractors, a U.S. district court held developer's
underlying indemnity claims were time-barred, but
nonetheless refused to dismiss the developer's claims against
the subcontractors for defense costs regarding the matters
covered by the indemnity.210
206. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15(a).
207. The California Code of Civil Procedure states:
The limitation prescribed by this section shall not be asserted by way of
defense by any person in actual possession or the control, as owner,
tenant or otherwise, of such an improvement, at the time any
deficiency in the improvement constitutes the proximate cause for
which it is proposed to bring an action.
Id. § 337.15(e).
208. The California Code of Civil Procedure further states:
As used in this section, "action" includes an action for indemnity
brought against a person arising out of that person's performance or
furnishing of services or materials referred to in this section, except
that a cross-complaint for indemnity may be filed pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 428.10 in an action which has been brought
within the time period set forth in subdivision (a) of this section.
Id. § 337.15(c).
209. See supra note 204.
210. See Centex I, supra note 114; Centex H, supra note 114; supra notes
114-15 and accompanying text.
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VII. CRAWFORD CREATES SIGNIFICANT, UNEXPECTED
BURDENS FOR SUBCONTRACTORS AND DESIGN PROFESSIONALS
The Crawford court attributed an unrealistic level of
legal sophistication to designers and subcontractors with
regard to their construction contracts,211 and displayed only
partial awareness of the economic constraints that could
impair typical contracting parties from obtaining legal
assistance in most contract negotiations.212 The court breezily
declared:
Parties to an indemnity contract can easily disclaim any
responsibility of the indemnitor for the indemnitee's
defense, or the costs thereof. Short of that, they can
specify that the indemnitor's sole defense obligation will
be to reimburse the indemnitee for costs incurred by the
latter in defending a particular claim."'
But is it really that easy for typical designers or
subcontractors to disclaim that defense liability? Is it
realistic to assume that laypersons will understand that a
promise to indemnify a client includes a legally implied duty
to defend that client from any claim alleging the designer's or
subcontractor's negligence, without regard to whether any
actual negligence occurred? Is it reasonable to assume that
degree of understanding when the promise only mentions
providing indemnity to the extent of damages caused by the
subcontractor or designer's own negligence, and never refers
to defending the client?
As the cases cited in Crawford and Regan Roofing attest,
such assumptions presume that subcontractors and designers
confronted with indemnity agreements are legally
sophisticated and can recognize when an agreement creates
such exposure-and that they will know how to address that
risk. 14 That degree of understanding did not prevail even
211. See Crawford, 187 P.3d at 436 (opining that parties can easily reallocate
defense duties in their contracts).
212. See supra notes 186-99 and accompanying text. In its discussion of
concerns raised by Weather Shield and its amici curiae, which included some
economic issues, the court fails to address any economic issues raised. See
Crawford, 187 P. 3d at 436.
213. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 436.
214. See generally the discussion of prior cases contained in Crawford, 187
P.3d at 432-435, and supra notes 50-52, 68-70. Previous litigants' failure to
squarely address what the Crawford court appears to regard as a clear
statutory requirement strongly suggests that neither they nor their counsel
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among most of the state's appellate judges for the fourteen
years following Regan Roofing.15 Yet, under Crawford, the
only way a non-lawyer designer or subcontractor can avoid
this broad, insurance-like defense duty is if the indemnity
promise expressly disclaims a broader defense duty.1 6
The use of a subcontractor's or designer's own attorney to
draft a standard agreement could, in theory, limit the broader
default defense duty recognized in Crawford. But that
assumes that subcontractors, designers, and their attorneys
will recognize the defense duties imposed by Crawford."7
Nearly a year after the decision, that appeared not to be the
case, as illustrated from a May 2009 meeting of attorneys and
in-house counsels from major California engineering firms.218
The meeting's minutes summarized a discussion of Crawford
with the comment that "[u]nder the facts in that case the
court found that a duty to defend exists upon the mere
allegation of a claim, if the contract between the parties so
provides.21 9  In other words, this group of design
professionals and attorneys who represent them remain
focused on contractual defense provisions, not the default
defense duty that Crawford found in every indemnity absent
language expressing a contrary intent. 20 Even if a standard
agreement addresses the post-Crawford default defense duty,
it solves only part of the problem. Except for contracts with
individual consumers, it is widely held that many clients of
understood that California Civil Code section 2778 could insert into every
indemnity agreement a default duty to defend the indemnitee upon a tender of
defense and without regard to any actual fault by the indemnitor-even when
the provision itself is silent with regard to the scope of defense.
215. In overruling Regan Roofing, the California Supreme Court classified as
an error and mistake the California Court of Appeal's failure to read section
2778 as imposing a broad default defense obligation. Crawford, 187 P.3d at
439. Until Crawford, however, Regan Roofing had received largely positive
treatment in other California Court of Appeal decisions for a decade and a half.
See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying discussion.
216. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 434.
217. See supra Part III.A.
218. Minutes from the 12th Annual Meeting of the ACEC California
Attorneys Roundtable, Manchester Grand Hyatt Hotel, San Diego, California
(May 22, 2009), http://www.aceccalif.orgluserdocuments/File/09-5-
22_.ARTjMin.pdf. This day-long meeting is held in connection with the annual
meeting of the California chapter of the American Council of Engineering
Companies.
219. Id. (emphasis added).
220. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 434.
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designers and subcontractors, if not the majority, insist on
using their own standard forms agreements.221
When faced with client-drafted contracts, the data on
private consulting engineering firms suggests that it is
unrealistic to presume that engineers have either the legal
sophistication to appreciate the defense duty recognized by
Crawford or economically feasible access to legal assistance
for most projects. Terra Insurance Company, which provides
professional liability coverage to engineering firms of various
sizes across the country, has collected data that demonstrates
the infeasibility of such assistance.222 In a 2009 underwriting
survey of its insureds, Terra found that they collectively
earned approximately $850 million in fees during 2008,223
with the average firm earning $11 million in fees for the year.
As a group they entered into contracts and started work on a
combined 35,711 new projects. 224  Dividing the revenues by
the number of projects shows that the average project
produced $23,800 in fees.
This average project size does not provide sufficient profit
to allow firms to seek legal review on each new contract they
sign. A typical design firm's profit margin is ten percent or
less,225 so the profit on an average-size project in 2008 would
have been on the order of just under $2,400. If it takes an
attorney four hours to review a contract for
indemnity/defense risks and assist the designer in
negotiations regarding those issues, the legal costs could
easily consume more than forty percent of the firm's profit on
an average-sized project.26 The competitive marketplace for
221. Telephone interview with Lisa Gamblin, supra note 145. In Ms.
Gamblin's ten years of experience managing loss prevention and claims at three
different professional liability insurance companies, designers had been able to
use their own contracts in no more than half of all projects that had resulted in
claims, and the firms reported success rates varying from twenty to seventy
percent in having clients accept the designers' standard form agreements. Id.
222. Telephone interview with David L. Coduto, supra note 200. See also E-
mail from Terra Insurance Company (May 5, 2009) (on file with author)
(providing an unpublished draft of the Terra Insurance Company 2009
Underwriting Survey).
223. E-mail from Terra Insurance Company, supra note 222 (providing an
unpublished draft of the Terra Insurance Company 2009 Underwriting Survey).
224. Id.
225. Telephone interview with James Withiam, supra note 199.
226. This assumes an average billing rate of $250/hour, which is on the low
side among counsel typically retained in insurance defense matters by Terra
Insurance Company. Telephone interview with Lisa Gamblin, supra note 145.
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design services does not provide sufficient fees for such
additional legal work.227 And, since most design firms earning
under $100 million in annual fees cannot justify in-house
legal counsel,2 most firms will not have the expertise for
such review.
On further examination, Terra's 2009 underwriting
survey reveals even stronger economic reasons why most
design firms do not seek legal review of their contracts.
While the average per-project fee is $23,800, that figure
includes a small number of very large contracts by relatively
large companies.229  For 2008, two-thirds of all projects
involved contracts with fees of $10,000 or less, with a median
contract fee of about $5,000.230 The profit margin on such a
small project makes it economically unsupportable to obtain
legal review: if one assumes $250 per hour as the cost for an
attorney, a mere two hours of assistance would turn more
than half of all projects into losing ventures. 2 1 Thus most
design firms must rely on their project managers-design
professionals, not attorneys-to negotiate their
agreements. 32  Therefore, recognizing and negotiating
indemnity provisions routinely falls on laypersons with no
specialized legal training.
Subcontractors have economic constraints similar to
those faced by designers. Fees and profits earned by the
largest subcontractors on their larger projects may justify the
costs of legal review and negotiation assistance; however, the
typical project is relatively small and without sufficient profit
for a subcontractor to obtain the assistance of legal counsel in
negotiating contract terms.2 3  And, like design professionals,
most subcontractors lack the training in or understanding of
legal matters necessary to appreciate the defense exposure
that Crawford says exists in every indemnity agreement
unless a contrary intention appears.
227. Id.
228. Telephone interview with James Withiam, supra note 199.
229. Telephone interview with David L. Coduto, supra note 200.
230. Id.
231. Id.; see also Telephone interview with Lisa Gamblin, supra note 145.
232. Telephone interview with Lisa Gamblin, supra note 145; see also
Telephone interview with James Withiam, supra note 199.
233. Telephone interview with James Withiam, supra note 199.
234. Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 187 P.3d 424, 431 (Cal. 2008)
(quoting CAL. Civ. CODE § 2778 (2009)).
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VIII. Is CRAWFORD'S ANALYSIS OF A SECTION 2778-BASED
DEFENSE DUTY MERE DICTUM?
If the indemnity-based defense obligations that Crawford
recognized under section 2778 appear harsh, often
uninsurable, and beyond the expectations of laypersons, does
a reasonable argument exist that would allow subcontractors
and designers to dismiss the court's discussion as dictum?
"Dicta" are surplus reasons or tangential observations that
are not necessary to a court's decision.235 One California
Court of Appeal noted:
[I]t is often difficult to draw hard lines between holdings
and dicta. The basic formula is to take account of facts
treated by the judge as material and determine whether
the contested opinion is based upon them.
In addition, even when part of an opinion is not
relevant to material facts, if it is responsive to an
argument raised by counsel and probably intended for
guidance of the court and attorneys upon a new hearing,
"it probably cannot be put aside as mere dictum.
'2 36
These principles thus beg the question whether
Crawford's discussion of section 2778 was essential to the
decision or mere dictum.
A. Was the Section 2778 Analysis Essential to the Holding
Regarding the Defense Owed?
As discussed above, the Crawford court declared that a
defense duty exists under every indemnity agreement and,
unless the agreement states otherwise, that it commences
upon the tender of defense for any claim potentially embraced
by the indemnity.2 7 However, the court appears to waffle
over when Weather Shield's defense duty actually arose.
Initially, it asserted that the duty arose when the
homeowners sued Peters, consistent with a duty based solely
235. United Steelworkers v. Bd. of Educ., 209 Cal. Rptr. 16, 21 (Ct. App.
1984) (citing the definition of "dictum" in 6 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE § 676 (2d ed. 1971)-now 9 B.E. WITKIN, WITKIN LEGAL INST.,
CAL. PROCEDURE § 509 (5th ed. 2008)). "iDictum is a general argument or
observation unnecessary to the decision which has no force as precedent." Id.
236. Id. at 17 (citations omitted).
237. See supra Part III.A.
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on the contract language.238 It later stated that the duty arose
on Peters's tender, consistent with its analysis of section
2778, 239 but which necessarily would have been at a time after
the homeowners had sued Peters.
This apparent ambiguity over when the duty arose calls
into question whether the analysis of section 2778 provides
the basis for the court's decision that Weather Shield owed
Peters a defense without regard to Weather Shield's
indemnity liability. As noted, the Crawford court held that
the subcontract's defense clause "confirmed" Weather Shield's
duty to defend Peters under the statute. 4' In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied upon its understanding of the
"duty to defend upon the indemnitee's request, as set forth in
subdivision 4 of section 2778 ''241 and on the fact that the
subcontract did not indicate any different intention.42 It then
considered arguments by Weather Shield for an outcome
consistent with the dissent in the Court of Appeal opinion
2 43
and with arguments of amici curiae in support of Weather
Shield. Those arguments would have predicated Weather
Shield's defense duty on a finding of liability under the
indemnity clause.2 " In the course of rejecting those
arguments, the Crawford court referenced the subcontract
and noted that Weather Shield's defense duty arose when the
238. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 431 (citing the subcontract's defense clause).
239. Id. at 432 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778(4) (2009)).
240. Id. at 434-35. "Here, the subcontract at issue not only failed to limit or
exclude Weather Shield's duty 'to defend' [Peters], as otherwise provided by
subdivision 4 of section 2778, it confirmed this duty." Id.
241. Id. at 439.
242. As the court had stated earlier in the opinion:
Implicit in this understanding of the duty to defend an indemnitee
against all claims "embraced by the indemnity," as specified in
subdivision 4 of section 2778, is that the duty arises immediately upon
a proper tender of defense by the indemnitee, and thus before the
litigation to be defended has determined whether indemnity is actually
owed. This duty, as described in the statute, therefore cannot depend
on the outcome of that litigation. It follows that, under subdivision 4 of
section 2778, claims "embraced by the indemnity," as to which the duty
to defend is owed, include those which, at the time of tender, allege
facts that would give rise to a duty of indemnity.
Id. at 434.
243. Id. at 435 (citing Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d
787, 838-45 (Ct. App. 2006) (O'Leary, J., dissenting) (stating that she would
have ruled in Weather Shield's favor on the defense duty)).
244. Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 187 P.3d 424, 435 (Cal. 2008).
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homeowners sued Peters.245
Just before rejecting Regan Roofing, the Crawford court
declared that the duty to defend "necessarily arose when such
a claim was made against the indemnitee, and thus did not
depend on whether the conditions of indemnity were, or were
not, later established." 6 While the obligation under section
2778(4) requires that the indemnitee tender its defense to the
indemnitor, the court's statements indicate that it recognized
that this particular subcontract required Weather Shield to
defend Peters when the homeowners sued Peters and alleged
that Weather Shield had been negligent-all of which would
have been at a point in time before Peters tendered its
defense to Weather Shield.247 This raises the possibility that
the subcontract actually provides a complete basis for the
court's holding, rather than merely serving to "confirm" a
defense duty owed under section 2778(4).248 If Weather
Shield's duty to defend Peters already existed before Peters
tendered its defense to Weather Shield, then a defense duty
arising upon tender would be redundant.
But does this render the entire discussion of a defense
duty owed under section 2778 unnecessary to the holding? Or
is the discussion interpreting the subcontract itself dictum,
secondary to the statute as the basis for the Crawford court's
holding? The language used by the court suggests stronger
support for the latter. The court referred to the subcontract's
defense clause as "confirming" the obligation created under
section 2778(4),249 suggesting that it viewed the defense
245. Id. at 442. The court stated:
We therefore conclude that the duty 'to defend' [Peters] against claims
"founded upon" damage or loss caused by Weather Shield's negligent
performance of its work, as set forth in Weather Shield's subcontract,
imposed such duties on Weather Shield as soon as a suit was filed
against [Peters] that asserted such claims, and regardless of whether it
was ultimately determined that Weather Shield was actually negligent.
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 435 ("[T]he subcontract required Weather
Shield 'to defend' [Peters] against 'any suit or action ... founded upon the claim
of such damage . . . .' Under this language, the duty to defend arose, as it
logically must, as soon as a 'suit or action' was brought against [Peters] that
was 'founded upon' a covered claim, i.e., that asserted a claim within the
coverage of both clauses." (emphasis added)).
246. Id. at 439.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 434-35.
249. Id. at 434 ("Here, the subcontract at issue not only failed to limit or
exclude Weather Shield's duty 'to defend' [Peters], as otherwise provided by
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clause as additional support for its conclusion rather than as
its primary basis. Furthermore, the court prefaced the
"confirming" observation by reiterating its interpretation that
the defense duty arises upon tender under subdivision (4).5 0
Later, the court turned to reinforcing considerations
including the subcontract 25' and its view that the defense duty
arose as soon as the plaintiffs sued Peters.252 Finally, the
court's use of the word "moreover" to introduce discussion of
the subcontract language253 further reinforces the view that
the subcontract's defense clause provided only a secondary,
surplus rationale for the decision.
Viewed as a whole, Crawford relied on an interpretation
of section 2778(4) as the basis for imposing a defense duty
that exists independent of indemnification liability, rather
than the subcontract's defense clause.
B. Language in Crawford Suggesting that Only a
Reimbursement Duty Applies in Absence of an Express
Defense Duty Is Dictum
Near the end of its opinion, the Crawford court explored
other ways that the parties might have allocated
responsibilities for defense costs:
As we have indicated, an express promise "to defend"
another against claims "founded upon" the promisor's acts
or omissions inherently incorporates the characteristics
they insist must be set forth in additional explicit terms.
And if the parties intended only to give the indemnitee a
subdivision 4 of section 2778, it confirmed this duty." (emphasis added)).
250. Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 187 P.3d 424, 434 (Cal. 2008).
251. The court stated:
[A]s we have explained, the duty to defend upon the indemnitee's
request, as set forth in subdivision 4 of section 2778, is distinct from,
and broader than, the duty expressed in subdivision 3 of the statute to
reimburse an indemnitee's defense costs as part of any indemnity
otherwise owed. Moreover, the subcontracts at issue in Regan Roofing,
like the one before us here, did explicitly indicate a separate and
distinct duty to defend the indemnitee, at the indemnitor's own cost
and expense, against suits raising claims covered by the indemnity.
That duty-like Weather Shield's in this case-necessarily arose when
such a claim was made against the indemnitee, and thus did not
depend on whether the conditions of indemnity were, or were not, later
established.
Id. at 439.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 435.
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right to after-the-fact reimbursement of its legal expenses
as a component of any indemnity otherwise owed by the
indemnitor, they would need no language to say so. That
right is already included in every indemnity contract,
unless otherwise specifically provided, under subdivision 3
of section 2778.2 4
The underlined language seems at odds with the broad
defense duty that the court previously said exists upon an
indemnitee's tender and "unless a contrary intention
appears."255 If parties must expressly state their intention to
limit an indemnitor's defense duty, regarding tendered
claims, to only the reimbursement of those costs incurred due
to the indemnitor's negligence,"'b then it seems clear that they
would need language to say so. If they do not provide such
language, then, per the court's reasoning earlier in the
opinion, they have not "provided otherwise" regarding section
2778(4) and the defense duty that arises upon tender does
not, therefore, depend upon actual liability under the
indemnity clause.
Aside from that single underlined sentence, it is possible
to reconcile the quote above with the opinion's fuller
discussion of section 2778. The point that "after-the-fact
reimbursement" exists automatically does not mean that such
reimbursement necessarily comprises the full extent of an
indemnitor's defense duty when a contract is silent on the
subject. The duty to reimburse an indemnitee exists under
section 2778(3), unless the parties agree to something
different, and the statute does not condition the
reimbursement right upon the indemnitee first tendering its
defense. 57 Thus, the remainder of the paragraph merely
makes the point that a contract need not expressly provide for
reimbursement of defense costs for an indemnitee to be able
to recover them, to the extent they concern matters embraced
by an indemnity provision.
Regardless, this part of the opinion clearly is dictum
because it explores hypothetical facts that differed from those
before the Crawford court. The Peters/Weather Shield
subcontract was not silent regarding defense, and the court
254. Id. at 441 (underlining added).
255. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778 (2009); Crawford, 187 P.3d at 431.
256. This is essentially the same duty as that imposed by section 2778(3).
257. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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found no evidence that "the parties intended only to give the
indemnitee a right to after-the-fact reimbursement."258
Furthermore, this part of the opinion considers the approach
of strict contract interpretation urged by Weather Shield but
rejected by the court. 59  The court only addressed that
approach to show that it would have reached the same result
under the alternate rationale: that Weather Shield owed
Peters a defense by the contract's express terms regardless of
Weather Shield's actual indemnity liability.
2 60
This part of the opinion is much better characterized as
dictum than as part of the court's underlying rationale. As
such, the comment that the parties would have needed no
additional language to provide only for the reimbursement of
defense costs21' does not undercut the broader defense duty
that the court noted exists for every indemnity agreement
under section 2778(4) and upon tender of defense, excepting
only where the parties indicate otherwise.262
C. Even if Regarded as Dictum, Crawford's Reasoning
Concerning Section 2778 Cannot Be Ignored
It appears unlikely that the Crawford court would
consider its analysis of section 2778 as dictum.2 3 But even if
viewed as such, the statutory analysis remains important.
The dicta of the California Supreme Court generally carries
with it great authoritative weight, as noted by one California
Court of Appeal:
"Even if properly characterized as dictum, statements of
the Supreme Court should be considered persuasive."
Twenty years ago, Presiding Justice Otto M. Kaus gave
some sage advice to trial judges and intermediate
258. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 441; see also id. at 434 (noting that the defense
clause as "confirm[ing]" the broad duty rather than expressing a contrary
intention).
25P. The Crawford court noted:
We are sensitive to the policy issues raised by Weather Shield and its
amici curiae. Nonetheless, for reasons stated at length above, we
decline the holding they propose. Even applying the rule of strict
construction they espouse, the instant contract already sets forth, in
unambiguous terms, an immediate and independent duty to defend.
Id. at 441 (emphasis omitted).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 434.
263. See supra Part VIII.A.
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appellate court justices: Generally speaking, follow dicta
from the California Supreme Court. That was good advice
264then and good advice now.
Therefore, and until the California Supreme Court holds
otherwise or the legislature changes the statute, parties in
California should anticipate that the courts will apply the
Crawford interpretation of section 2778 and hold that unless
otherwise provided, section 2778 places in every contract a
default duty to assume tendered defense against all claims
embraced by an indemnity, regardless of the merit of those
claims.265
IX. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite comments to the contrary, the California
Supreme Court has interpreted section 2778 as imposing on
indemnitors a defense duty that is at least as broad as that
owed by insurance carriers to their insureds.266  Unless
expressly disclaimed or limited, this defense duty exists
under every indemnity contract upon an indemnitee's tender
of its defense for any claim that, if proven, falls within the
scope of the indemnity. 27 The defense duty that the Crawford
decision reads into every indemnity agreement as a default
can impose huge, unanticipated burdens on any party that
agrees to indemnify another.268  Furthermore, for design
professionals, the defense duty may be beyond insurance
269
coverage.
Rather than enforcing the reasonable expectations of
contracting parties, the Crawford court's interpretation of
section 2778 arguably denies many parties what they would
expect from a plain reading of their contracts. If an
indemnity provision is silent regarding defense obligations
and requires indemnity only to the extent of the indemnitor's
negligence, would a lay person nevertheless know about an
unstated duty to defend indemnitees upon tender and without
regard to actual liability? Indeed, subcontractors have
264. Hubbard v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819, 822 (Ct. App. 1997)
(citations omitted).
265. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 433.
266. See supra Part V.
267. See supra Part III.A.
268. See supra Part IV.
269. See supra Part IV.
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argued that in negotiating agreements they were not aware of
any such unstated duty to defend nor did they understand
such obligations.' And, as the pre-Crawford case law
showed,271 many of the state's appellate judges similarly failed
to see such a duty.
Although parties remain free to negotiate a different
defense duty, recommending that designers and
subcontractors negotiate better contract terms is an
inadequate solution to this problem. Such negotiations
require a high level of legal sophistication or access to outside
counsel to assist in pinpointing indemnity-based defense
issues where they occur, understanding the particular risks
in each contract, devising appropriate remedial language,
effectively explaining both the proposed changes and their
underlying rationale to a client, and productively negotiating
a solution. These tasks entail legal expertise beyond that of
most subcontractors and design professionals, or outside legal
assistance that most design and construction projects cannot
economically support. Indeed, it is probably beyond the legal
sophistication of most contracting parties in fields other than
design and construction, and nothing in Crawford suggests
that courts should not apply this rule to every indemnity
272
agreement.
So what can realistically be done? Going forward, parties
asked to sign indemnity agreements can add language that
defines a narrower defense obligation, such as one tied to
reimbursement for costs to the extent of the indemnitor's
proven negligence. This is what the Crawford court
envisioned.2  Yet such a solution may prove practical for only
the largest, most sophisticated, and "best-lawyered" parties.
Because a vast majority of contracts involve sums too
270. See, e.g., Reagan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 415 (Ct.
App. 1994) (noting that Mike Regan, a principal of Regan Roofing Company had
declared that he did not see, understand, or have an opportunity to negotiate
the indemnity provision's terms).
271. See infra app. C.
272. Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 187 P.3d 424, 434 (Cal. 2008).
(noting that the statute places these defense obligations "in every indemnity
contract, unless the agreement provides otherwise" (emphasis added)).
273. Id. at 436 ("Parties to an indemnity contract can easily disclaim any
responsibility of the indemnitor for the indemnitee's defense, or the costs
thereof."); see also supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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small to justify such legal expenses, 74 the Crawford decision
leaves many persons exposed to future surprises from a
hidden defense duty-even when the agreement otherwise
merely restates the parties' equitable indemnity obligations.
A far better solution would be a rule that, unless parties
expressly agree otherwise, an agreement to indemnify
imposes only the duty to reimburse an indemnitee for defense
costs attributable to those matters for which the indemnitor
has actual liability. "Equitable indemnity" provides a
reasonable and intuitively fair default for parties that do not
have a specific indemnity agreement by imposing a duty that
corresponds to the extent of a tortfeasor's fault.275 Parties can
negotiate a broader (or narrower) indemnification scope if
they want something different. Such a rule would create a
default defense duty similarly tied to the extent of the
tortfeasor's indemnity duty, and thus to the extent of its
fault.276 If the parties want to specify a defense duty that
differs in scope from the indemnity duty, they could always do
so by contract. Such a rule regarding defense under
indemnity would also more closely track the court's view that
the indemnity duty under non-insurance indemnity
agreements should be construed differently from those under
insurance agreements.277 That seems more likely to match
the reasonable expectations of lay parties.
The California legislature could otherwise accomplish
this result by removing subsection four from section 2778.
Short of that, the legislature could modify subsection four and
restore indemnitors' default defense obligation to what most
appellate courts had recognized under Regan Roofing: a duty
that applies only to the extent of the indemnity obligation.2 7
8
A demand for defense would still have significance for
reimbursement under section 2778(3), because a refusal of a
tender would continue to impact the conclusiveness of any
subsequent settlement or judgment.9
The example below illustrates a modification to achieve
that result (additions shown with underlining; deletions
274. See supra notes 222-34 and accompanying text
275. See discussion supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
276. See discussion supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
277. See supra Part V.
278. See infra app. C; see supra Part III.C.
279. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 431 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778(5) (2009)).
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shown with double strike-out):
4. To the same extent that indemnity is owed to the person
indemnified, the The person indemnifying is bound, on
request of the person indemnified, to defend actions or
proceedings brought against the latter in respect to the
matters embraced by the indemnity, but the person
indemnified has the right to conduct such defenses, if he
chooses to do so;
Alternatively, the legislature could limit subsection four
to apply only in the insurance context-where, as the court
declared, a broad duty to defend exists-as in the example
below:
4. Under any agreement to provide insurance, the The
person indemnifying is bound, on request of the person
indemnified, to defend actions or proceedings brought
against the latter in respect to the matters embraced by
the indemnity, but the person indemnified has the right to
conduct such defenses, if he chooses to do so;
Changing any statute-and particularly changing one
that has remained unchanged since 1872-could be a long
and difficult process. The California Supreme Court could
obviate the need for legislation by clarifying its opinion in a
manner that restores the rule that most parties, and also
most appellate judges, had taken from Regan Roofing. This
step would neither require reversing Crawford nor
reinstating Regan Roofing. Both of those cases involved
subcontracts that contained express defense clauses that
clearly created separate, independent defense duties that did
not depend on actual indemnity liability or application of
section 2778. Thus, on the basis of the subcontract language
alone, both indemnitors arguably had promised to defend
their clients from such claims, and enforcing that promise
need not have required any reference to the indemnity
clauses of their respective contracts. Yet the court has
declined to so clarify its opinion, having denied review to at
least one of the six California Court of Appeal cases that had
relied upon Crawford.280
As a matter of public policy, we want parties' contracts to
280. Aerospace Dynamics Intern., Inc. v. Frize Corp., Inc., No. B186725, 2008
WL 5096982, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2008) (indicating that the California
Supreme Court denied review on February 25, 2009).
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mean what the parties reasonably understand them to mean.
If a contract is silent regarding any duty to defend, it is
reasonable to assume that the parties did not intend to create
any such duty. In this instance, the California Supreme
Court has issued a ruling that, if not addressed, imposes a
defense liability on parties in the absence of any contractual
expression of intent to assume that burden."' Left
uncorrected, the Crawford decision creates hidden,
unexpected obligations that will exist in every contract unless
expressly disclaimed.
Ideally, the court should resolve this problem by
clarifying that its opinion should be read as based on explicit
language in the defense clause of the Peters/Weather Shield
subcontract. If the court will not do so, the legislature should
restore the pre-Crawford understanding of Regan Roofing, an
understanding that corresponds to the ordinary expectations
of parties both inside the design and construction industries
and beyond.
281. Crawford, 187 P.3d at 434 ("[Section 2778] places in every indemnity
contract, unless the agreement provides otherwise, a duty to assume the
indemnitee's defense, if tendered, against all claims 'embraced by the
indemnity.'").
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APPENDIX A: CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE §2778
2778. Rules of Interpretation.
In the interpretation of a contract of indemnity, the
following rules are to be applied, unless a contrary intention
appears:
1. Upon an indemnity against liability, expressly, or in
other equivalent terms, the person indemnified is entitled to
recover upon becoming liable;
2. Upon an indemnity against claims, or demands, or
damages, or costs, expressly, or in other equivalent terms, the
person indemnified is not entitled to recover without payment
thereof;
3. An indemnity against claims, or demands, or liability,
expressly, or in other equivalent terms, embraces the costs of
defense against such claims, demands, or liability incurred in
good faith, and in the exercise of a reasonable discretion;
4. The person indemnifying is bound, on request of the
person indemnified, to defend actions or proceedings brought
against the latter in respect to the matters embraced by the
indemnity, but the person indemnified has the right to
conduct such defenses, if he chooses to do so;
5. If, after request, the person indemnifying neglects to
defend the person indemnified, a recovery against the latter
suffered by him in good faith, is conclusive in his favor
against the former;
6. If the person indemnifying, whether he is a principal
or a surety in the agreement, has not reasonable notice of the
action or proceeding against the person indemnified, or is not
allowed to control its defense, judgment against the latter is
only presumptive evidence against the former;
7. A stipulation that a judgment against the person
indemnified shall be conclusive upon the person
indemnifying, is inapplicable if he had a good defense upon
the merits, which by want of ordinary care he failed to
establish in the action.
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APPENDIX B: LAW IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Four other states-Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
and South Dakota-have statutes with exactly the same
language as California's Civil Code section 2778.282 In
addition, statutes and case law in those states and others
either expressly address the defense duties owed under
indemnity clauses, or suggest how courts might rule if
confronted with circumstances similar to those of Crawford.
State Comment
Alabama Neither statute nor case law indicate how Alabama
courts might rule regarding the defense duties owed
under an indemnity agreement.
Alaska No statute governs the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement in Alaska.
No Defense Duty: The Alaska Supreme Court in Rogers
& Babler v. State, 713 P.2d 795 (Alaska 1986),
declined to impose a defense duty where the
indemnity agreement was silent regarding defense
obligations. "The duty to 'indemnify and hold
harmless' against claims does not impose on the
indemnitor an immediate duty, upon request, to
provide and pay for the ongoing defense of claims
against the indemnitee."
Defense Duty: The supreme court in Hoffman
Construction Co. of Alaska v. U.S. Fabrication &
Erection, Inc., 32 P.3d 346 (Alaska 2001), imposed a
defense duty independent of indemnification liability
when the contract included an express defense
provision.
Arizona Statute: ARIz. REV. STAT. § 32-1159 (2009) bars
indemnification or defense for a party's own sole
negligence in private contracts involving construction
or architect-engineer professional services. It does
not apply to public entities.
No Defense Duty: The Arizona Court of Appeals, in MT
Builders L.L. C. v. Fisher Roofing, Inc., 197 P.3d 758
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2008), declined to impose a defense
duty independent of indemnification liability where
282. See supra note 119.
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State Comment
the contract included a provision limiting indemnity
"to the extent" of indemnitor's negligence and was
silent regarding defense obligations. The Arizona
court acknowledged and expressly declined to adopt
the Crawford court's reasoning.
Arkansas Statute: ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-56-104 (2009) bars
indemnification or defense for an indemnitee's own
negligence in any contract involving construction or
design services, with exceptions provided for the
negligence of the indemnitor or where the contract
requires insurance coverage for the indemnity and
defense obligations.
No Defense Duty: The court of appeals, in East-Harding
v. Piazza, 91 S.W.3d 547 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002),
declined to impose a defense duty where the
indemnity agreement was silent regarding defense
obligations. Indemnitor's obligation was only to
reimburse defense costs to the extent of proven
indemnity liability.
California -
Colorado Statute: COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (6)(c) (2009) bars
indemnification or defense in any construction
contract beyond the extent of the indemnitor's fault.
No case law indicates how Colorado courts might rule
regarding the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement.
Connecticut Statute: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572k (2008) prohibits
indemnification of a party for its own negligence in
construction agreements, but makes no mention of
defense obligations.
No case law indicates how Connecticut courts might rule
regarding the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement and the annotated statutes
citing references to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572k.
Delaware Statute: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2704 (2009) prohibits
indemnification for damages caused, resulting or
arising partially or solely by, from or out of the
negligence of any party other than the promisor or
indemnitor. Further, the section expressly declares it
applies to "preconstruction professionals, such as
designers, planners and architects."
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Appendix B. (continued)
State Comment
No Defense Duty: In Hartford Fire Insurance v.
Pettinaro Construction Co., 820 F. Supp. 154 (D. Del.
1993), the district court declined to impose a defense
duty independent of indemnification, although the
contract contained an express defense obligation.
District of Neither statute nor case law indicate how District of
Columbia Columbia courts might rule regarding the defense
duties owed under an indemnity agreement.
Florida Statutes: FLA. STAT. § 725.06 (2009) bars indemnity from
damages caused "by any act, omission, or default of
the indemnitee arising from the contract ... unless
the contract contains a monetary limitation on the
extent of the indemnification that bears a reasonable
commercial relationship to the contract, and is part of
the project specifications or bid documents, if any." In
addition, the statute specifically bars requirements
regarding defense of a public entity except "to the
extent caused by the negligence, recklessness, or
intentional wrongful misconduct of the indemnifying
party."
FLA. STAT. § 725.08 further limits all agreements
between design professionals and public entities to
apply only where harm is "caused by the negligence,
recklessness, or intentionally wrongful conduct of the
design professional" and its employees.
No Defense Duty: The court of appeals in Barton-Malow
Co. v. Grunau Co., 835 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002) declined to impose a defense duty independent
of indemnification liability where a single sentence
addressed both indemnity and defense.
Defense Duty: The district court in Padron Warehouse
Corp. v. Realty Associates Fund III, L.P., 377 F. Supp.
2d 1259 (S.D. Fla. 2005), imposed a defense duty
independent of indemnification liability in a case that
did not identify whether the contract included any
express defense provision. The court articulated a
general rule "that an indemnitee under an
indemnification agreement is entitled to recover
reasonable attorney's fees and legal costs which he is
compelled to pay as a result of suits brought against
him relating to matters for which he is entitled to be
indemnified." Further, "[t]his rule is equally
applicable whether the indemnitee is successful in his
[Vol:50
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Appendix B. (continued)
State Comment
defense of the suit or not."
In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 592 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), the
court of appeal imposed a defense duty independent of
indemnification liability where the contract had
separate sentences for indemnity and defense.
Georgia Statute: GA. CODE § 13-8-2 (2009) provides a bar to
indemnification for a party's sole negligence.
No Defense Duty: The court of appeal in George L. Smith
II Georgia World Congress Center Authority v. Miller
Brewing Co., 566 S.E.2d 361 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002),
expressly held no obligation to pay the indemnitee's
attorney fees where the agreement did not mention
any obligation to defend the indemnitee or to pay
attorney fees or expenses of litigation.
Hawaii No statute indicates the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement in Hawaii.
Defense Duty: The court of appeal in Pancakes of
Hawaii, Inc. v. Pomare Properties Corp., 944 P.2d 83
(Haw. Ct. App. 1997), imposed a defense duty
independent of indemnification liability where the
contract included an express defense provision. The
court expressly applied the rules for insurance
agreements to interpret the indemnity contract.
Idaho Neither statute nor case law indicates how Idaho courts
might rule regarding the defense duties owed under
an indemnity agreement.
Illinois No statute indicates the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement in Illinois.
No Defense Duty: The appellate court in Gust K
Newberg Construction Co. v Fischbach, Moore &
Morrissey, Inc., 196 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964),
declined to impose a defense duty independent of
indemnification liability where the contract was silent
regarding defense obligations. General
indemnification by subcontractor for its negligence
required it to reimburse the contractor for its costs
and attorney's fees caused by subcontractor's
negligence; but did not require subcontractor to
defend suit brought by subcontractor's employee
against general contractor.
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Appendix B. (continued)
State Comment
Indiana No statute indicates the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement in Indiana.
No Defense Duty: The court of appeal in United
Consulting Engineers v. Board of Commissioners, 810
N.E.2d 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), declined to impose a
defense duty independent of indemnification,
although the contract contained an express defense
obligation. The court limited the indemnitor's defense
duty to the extent of its negligence.
Iowa Neither statutes nor case law indicate how Iowa courts
might rule regarding the defense duties owed under
an indemnity agreement.
Kansas Statute: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-121 (2008) provides a bar
to indemnification for a party's own negligence, except
where the indemnification is covered by insurance
paid for by the promisee.
No Defense Duty: The court of appeal in Dillard v.
Shaughnessy, Fickel & Scott Architects, Inc., 943
S.W.2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (applying Kansas
law), declined to impose a defense duty when the
indemnity agreement was silent regarding defense
obligations. Subcontractor not required to indemnify
general contractor for attorney's fees it incurred to
defend itself, but subcontractor required to indemnify
general contractor for expenses it incurred to
reimburse other parties' attorney's fees, because those
expenses fit the definition of contractor's "liability,
loss, cost or expenses" under the agreement.
Kentucky No statute indicates the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement in Kentucky.
No Defense Duty(?): The court of appeal in ARA Services,
Inc. v. Pineville Comm. Hospital, 2 S.W.3d 104 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1999), declined to impose a defense duty
independent of indemnification, although the contract
contained an express defense obligation. Verdict for
hospital (indemnitee) and its food service contractor
(indemnitor) in personal injury suit by contractor's
employee precluded hospital's entitlement to
indemnity for attorney fees from contractor, where
indemnity only applied to claims attributable to
contractor's sole negligence. But, while decision could
have rested on the fact that allegations against
multiple defendants did not sound in "sole
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negligence," the court instead noted only that "the
Hospital was determined not to be liable for Lewis's
injuries; there can be no indemnity since there is no
liability."
Louisiana Statute: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2780 (2009) (well for oil,
gas, or water, or drilling for minerals) voids any
indemnity or defense requirement to the extent that it
applies to liability for "the sole or concurrent
negligence or fault (strict liability) of the indemnitee."
One of the few statutes to begin so colorfully: "The
legislature finds that an inequity is foisted on certain
contractors and their employees .... "
No Defense Duty: The court of appeal in Robin v. Wong,
971 So. 2d 386 (La. Ct. App. 2007), declined to impose
a defense duty independent of indemnification where
the contract was silent regarding defense obligations.
The district court in Nesom v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 633
F. Supp. 55 (E.D. La., 1984), declined to impose a
defense duty independent of indemnification beyond
the extent of reimbursement of costs incurred due to
the indemnitor's negligence, although the contract
contained an express defense obligation.
Defense Duty: The court of appeal in Star Enterprises v.
American Manufacturing Mutual Insurance Co., 847
So. 2d 717 (La. Ct. App. 2003), imposed a defense duty
independent of indemnification where the contract
contained an express defense obligation.
Maine Neither statutes nor case law indicate how Maine courts
might rule regarding the defense duties owed under
an indemnity agreement.
Maryland Neither statutes nor case law indicate how Maryland
courts might rule regarding the defense duties owed
under an indemnity agreement.
Massachusetts No statute indicates the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement in Massachusetts.
No Defense Duty: The appellate court in Miley v.
Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 668 N.E.2d
369 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996), declined to impose a
defense duty independent of indemnification where
the contract was silent regarding defense obligations.
The court held that an indemnity "'from.. . all
claims, losses, liabilities and expenses, including
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attorney's fees'. . , is not enough to impose an
independent duty to defend."
No Defense Duty (Qualified): The appellate court in
Sheehan v. Modern Continental /Healy, 822 N.E.2d
305 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005), declined to impose a
defense duty independent of indemnification where
the underlying complaint did not allege indemnitor's
negligence, although the contract contained an
express defense obligation. But, the court noted that
liability would exist if the plaintiffs underlying
complaint had alleged a basis for indemnification.
Defense Duty: The district court in Level 3
Communications v. MCI Worldcom, No. 995641, 2001
WL 914892 (Mass. Dist. Ct. July 3, 2001), imposed a
defense duty independent of indemnification and
despite no indemnity liability, where the contract
contained an express defense obligation.
The appellate court in Urban Investment & Development
Co. v. Turner Construction Co., 616 N.E.2d 829 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1993), imposed a defense duty independent of
indemnification where the contract contained an
express defense obligation, although jury exonerated
indemnitor (and indemnitee) of liability to plaintiff.
Michigan No statute indicates the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement in Michigan.
No Defense Duty: The Michigan Court of Appeals, in
Grand Trunk Western Railroad, Inc. v. Auto
Warehousing Co., 686 N.W.2d 756 (Mich. Ct. App.
2004), declined to impose a defense duty independent
of indemnification, although the contract contained an
express defense obligation. The court expressly
distinguished indemnity from insurance and declared
that defense duty is not absolute, even when contract
contains express defense provision.
Minnesota No statute indicates the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement in Minnesota.
Defense Duty: The Minnesota Supreme Court in
Microtek Medical, Inc. v. 3M Co., 942 So. 2d 122
(Miss. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Upchurch
Plumbing, Inc. v. Greenwood Utilities Commission,
964 So. 2d 1100 (Miss. 2007) (applying Minnesota
law), imposed a defense duty independent of
indemnification, although the contract was silent
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regarding defense obligations.
No Defense Duty: The Eighth Circuit in Sargent v.
Johnson, 601 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1979), declined to
impose a defense duty independent of indemnification,
although the contract contained an express defense
obligation. There is no obligation to cover defense if
indemnitee was negligent.
No statute indicates the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement in Mississippi.
Defense Duty: The Mississippi Supreme Court in Blain
v. Sam Finley, Inc., 226 So. 2d 742 (Miss. 1969),
imposed a defense duty independent of
indemnification, although the contract was silent
regarding defense obligations. The court held the
obligation to indemnify for attorney's fees, costs, or
expenses extends to such expenses incurred in the
successful defense of suits or the defense of groundless
suits, at least where the subcontractor rejects the
demand of the contractor to take over the defense.
Statute: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 434.100 (2009) (Vernon's) bars
any agreement to indemnify or hold harmless a party
from that party's own negligence, unless the
agreement to "indemnify, defend or hold harmless"
also "requires the party to obtain specified limits of
insurance to insure the indemnity obligation and the
party had the opportunity to recover the cost of the
required insurance in its contract price." Pending
legislation would add clear statement that the statute
includes defense costs and would broaden the
prohibition to include the negligence of anyone for
whom the indemnitee is responsible.
Defense Duty: The court of appeal in List & Clark
Construction Co. v. McGlone, 296 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1956), imposed a defense duty independent of
indemnification if indemnitor refused the defense
tender, but limited the duty to the extent of the
indemnification, if tender accepted. The court held
that the obligation to indemnify for attorneys' fees,
costs, or expenses extends to such expenses incurred
in the successful defense of suits or the defense of
groundless suits, at least where the subcontractor
rejects the demand of the contractor to take over the
defense.
Mississippi
Missouri
20101
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Appendix B. (continued)
State Comment
Montana Statutes: MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-11-313 to -317 (2009)
contains language identical to CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778.
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 18-2-124 and 28-2-2111 (2009) bars
indemnification in construction contracts for an
indemnitee's negligence, but permits agreements for
indemnity and defense of claims caused by
indemnitor's fault or that of third persons.
Defense Duty: The Montana Supreme Court in Amazi v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 816 P.2d 431 (Mont. 1991),
imposed liability for defense of a client's concurrent
negligence, but only because the contract expressly
required it. The case made no reference to the
indemnity interpretation statutes, MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 28-11-313 to -317.
Nebraska Neither statutes nor case law indicate how Nebraska
courts might rule regarding the defense duties owed
under an indemnity agreement.
Neither statutes nor case law indicate how Nevada
courts might rule regarding the defense duties owed
under an indemnity agreement.
New No statute indicates the defense duties owed under an
Hampshire indemnity agreement in New Hampshire.
Defense Duty: The New Hampshire Supreme Court in
John J. Keating, v. United Instruments, Inc., 742 A.2d
128 (N.H. 1999), imposed a defense duty independent
of indemnification where the contract contained an
express defense obligation, despite a defense verdict
for both defendants.
New Jersey No statute indicates the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement in New Jersey.
No Defense Duty: The court in Serpa v. New Jersey
Transit, 951 A.2d 208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2008), declined to impose a defense duty independent
of indemnification, although the contract contained an
express defense obligation. The court specifically held
that, absent explicit contractual language to the
contrary, an indemnitee is not allowed to recover from
the indemnitor for attorneys fees incurred in
defending allegations of its own independent fault.
The court in Nagim v. New Jersey Transit, 848 A.2d 61
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003), declined to impose a
defense duty independent of indemnification if
Nevada
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Comment
indemnitee was not wholly without fault, although the
contract contained an express defense obligation.
Defense Duty: The court in Bethelem Steel Corp. v.
KL. 0. Welding Erectors, Inc., 334 A.2d 346 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), imposed a defense duty
independent of indemnification, although the contract
was silent regarding defense obligations. The
subcontractor was held liable for attorney's fees and
costs incurred by contractor in successfully defending
a wrongful death action regarding one of
subcontractor's employees, where it could be
reasonably inferred that parties intended attorneys'
fees and costs to be subject to indemnification under
contract, and where the contract provided for full
indemnity to contractor for any and all loss or liability
by reason of death, personal injury or property
damage arising out of construction work occurring on
job site, regardless of cause or legal responsibility.
Statute: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-7-1 (2009) limits
indemnification to the extent of an indemnitor's fault,
but does not say whether defense duty is similarly
limited.
No case law indicates how New Mexico courts might rule
regarding the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement.
New York No statute indicates the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement in New York.
No Defense Duty: The appellate court in Hennard v.
Boyce, 776 N.Y.S.2d 411 (App. Div. 2004), declined to
impose a defense duty independent of indemnification
liability but did not identify whether the contract
included an express defense provision.
Defense Duty: The court in Bradley v. Earl B. Feiden,
Inc., 817 N.Y.S.2d 409 (2006), imposed a defense duty
independent of indemnification liability where the
contract included any express defense provision.
No statute(s) indicates the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement in North Carolina.
No Defense Duty: The court of appeal in Cooper v. H.B.
Owsley & Son, Inc., 258 S.E.2d 842 (N.C. Ct. App.
1979), declined to impose a defense duty independent
of indemnification, although the contract contained an
express defense obligation. The court held that even
North
Carolina
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if a contract specifically provides indemnification for
an indemnitee's negligence, it still must reflect clear
intent to cover attorney's fees and defense costs before
they are recoverable.
North Dakota Statute: N.D. CENT. CODE § 22-02-07 (2009) contains
language identical to CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778.
No Defense Duty: The North Dakota Supreme Court in
Barsness v. General Diesel & Equipment Co., 422
N.W.2d 819 (N.D. 1988), declined to impose a defense
duty independent of indemnification where the
contract was silent regarding defense obligations.
The case does not make any reference to N.D. CENT.
CODE § 22-02-07.
Ohio Neither statutes nor case law indicate how Ohio courts
might rule regarding the defense duties owed under
an indemnity agreement.
Oklahoma Statute: OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 427 (2009) is language
identical to CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778.
No Defense Duty: The appellate court in Estate of King
v. Wagoner County Board of County Commissioners,
146 P.3d 833 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006), declined to
impose a defense duty independent of indemnification,
although the contract contained an express defense
obligation. The court found attorney fees that an
owner independently incurred in defending against
plaintiffs' allegations of negligence against owner
were not recoverable because the indemnity
agreement did not provide for indemnity against
owner's own negligence. The case does not make any
reference to OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 427.
Oregon No statute indicates the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement in Oregon.
Defense Duty: The court of appeals in National Union
Fire Insurance Co. v. Starplex Corp., 188 P.3d 332 (Or.
Ct. App. 2008), imposed a defense duty independent of
indemnification, although the contract was silent
regarding defense obligations. The court held that the
standard for determining a contractual indemnitor's
defense duty to its indemnitee is the same as that for
finding an insurer's duty to defend an insured.
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Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South
Carolina
South Dakota
Neither statutes nor case law indicate how Pennsylvania
courts might rule regarding the defense duties owed
under an indemnity agreement.
Neither statutes nor case law indicate how Rhode Island
courts might rule regarding the defense duties owed
under an indemnity agreement.
Neither statutes nor case law indicate how South
Carolina courts might rule regarding the defense
duties owed under an indemnity agreement.
Statute: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 56-3-10 (2009) contains
language identical to CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778.
No case law indicates how South Dakota courts might
rule regarding the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement.
Tennessee Neither statutes nor case law indicate how Tennessee
courts might rule regarding the defense duties owed
under an indemnity agreement.
Texas Statute: TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 271.904 (Vernon's)
bars public entities from requiring indemnification or
defense beyond the extent of the indemnitor's
negligence in architecture and engineering
agreements.
Defense Duty: The appellate court in English v. BGP
International Inc., 174 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. App. 2005),
imposed a defense duty independent of
indemnification where the contract contained an
express defense obligation. The court noted that
indemnitor's duty to defend indemnitee may arise
even when it is later determined that the indemnitor
has no duty to indemnify Nonetheless, the
indemnitor is not required to defend indemnitee if the
underlying pleadings do not allege facts within the
scope of the indemnity.
No Defense Duty: The Texas Supreme Court in Fisk
Electric Co. v. Constructors & Associates, Inc., 888
S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1994), declined to impose a defense
duty independent of indemnification although the
contract contained an express defense obligation.
Where indemnity agreement did not comply with
Texas's "express negligence test," subcontractor-
indemnitor had no obligation to indemnify contractor-
indemnitee for costs or expenses resulting from claim
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against it for its own negligence, even though
contractor-indemnitee was ultimately not found to be
negligent.
Utah Neither statutes nor case law indicate how Utah courts
might rule regarding the defense duties owed under
an indemnity agreement.
Vermont No statutes indicate the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement in Vermont.
Defense Duty: The Vermont Supreme Court in Hamelin
v. Simpson Paper (Vermont) Co., 702 A.2d 86 (Vt.
1997), imposed a defense duty independent of
indemnification, although the contract was silent
regarding defense obligations.
Virginia Neither statutes nor case law indicate how Virginia
courts might rule regarding the defense duties owed
under an indemnity agreement.
Washington Neither statutes nor case law indicate how Washington
courts might rule regarding the defense duties owed
under an indemnity agreement.
West Virginia Neither statutes nor case law indicate how West
Virginia courts might rule regarding the defense
duties owed under an indemnity agreement.
Wisconsin No statutes indicate the defense duties owed under an
indemnity agreement in Wisconsin.
Defense Duty: The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Barrons
v. J.H. Findorff & Sons, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 827 (Wis.
1979), imposed a defense duty independent of
indemnification when indemnitor refused
indemnitee's tender, even though the contract was
silent regarding defense obligations.
Wyoming Neither statutes nor case law indicate how Wyoming
courts might rule regarding the defense duties owed
under an indemnity agreement.
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APPENDIX C: TREATMENT OF REGAN ROOFING IN
CITING REFERENCES
The table below summarizes the treatment of Regan
Roofing 3  by various courts until the Crawford court
disapproved of its holding in July 2008. The author obtained
this listing from a Westlaw Keycite performed on May 6,
2009.
Tablel. California Supreme Court (1 Opinion): 0 positive, 1 negative, 1
published.
Published Treatment Case
Yes Neg Disapproved of Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg. Inc., 187
by P.3d 424, 430 (Cal. 2008).
Table 2. California court of Appeal (33 Opinions): 26 positive, 7 negative,
15 published.
Published Treatment Case
No Pos Cited Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. Tyler Refrigeration,
No. B202067, 2009 WL 223712, at *2 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2009).
No Pos Cited Middleton v. L&J Assets, L.L.C., No.
B198133, 2008 WL 2764582, at *3 (Cal. Ct.
App. July 17, 2008).
No Pos Cited Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. N.Y. Times Co.,
80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 6, 12 (Ct. App. 2008).
No Neg Distinguished Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Lyles Diversified, Inc.,
by No. A115297, 2008 WL 1813173, at *4 (Ct.
App. Apr. 23, 2008).
Yes Pos Mentioned City of Watsonville v. Corrigan, 58 Cal. Rptr.
3d 458, 463 (Ct. App. 2007).
Yes Pos Cited Singh v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 348,
350 (Ct. App. 2006).
No Neg Distinguished Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 38
by Cal. Rptr. 3d 787, 791 (Ct. App. 2006).
Yes Pos Cited City of Rancho Cucamonga v. Reg'l Water
Quality Control Bd.-Santa Ana Region, 38
Cal. Rptr. 3d 450, 457 (Ct. App. 2006).
283. Reagan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 413 (Ct. App.
1994).
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Published Treatment Case
No Pos Cited Jocer Enters., Inc. v. Attig, No. E036701,
2005 WL 3007789, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App.
Nov. 10, 2005).
No Pos Cited Devine v. Carter, No. A108843, 2005 WL
2203252, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
No Pos Cited Ramirez v. W. Hills Estates, No. E035723,
2005 WL 852148, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr.
14, 2005).
No Pos Cited Sanders Inc. Architecture/Engg v. Bd. of
Trustees of Cal. State Univ., No. D043591,
2005 WL 428882, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb.
23, 2005).
No Pos Cited Dame Constr. Co. v. Indep. Constr. Co., No.
A098611, 2004 WL 1683164, at *4 (Cal. Ct.
App. July 28, 2004).
No Pos Mentioned Boehle v. Westminster Invs., Inc., No.
D041702, 2004 WL 1246025, at *4 (Cal.
Ct. App. June 8, 2004).
No Neg Distinguished Franciscan Hill Homeowners Ass'n v.
by Newhall Land & Farming Co., No.
B 139859, 2003 WL 22853530, at *3 (Cal.
Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2003).
No Pos Cited Bagai v. Kashani, No. A099325, 2003 WL
21771985, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. July 31,
2003).
No Pos Cited Potts v. Childnet Youth & Family Servs., No.
B159629, 2003 WL 21186256, at *3 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003).
No Pos Cited Williams Commc'ns, Inc. v. Lazar, No.
E030677, 2002 WL 1265625, at *1 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 7, 2002).
Yes Pos Cited Vargas v. Athena Assurance Co., 115 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 426, 429 (Ct. App. 2001).
No Neg Distinguished Delman v. Cal. Farm Ins. Co., No. C030695,
by 2001 WL 1656583, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 11, 2001).
Yes Neg Disagreement Catalano v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d
Recognized by 842, 846 (Ct. App. 2000).
Yes Neg Distinguished Centex Golden Constr. Co. v. Dale Tile Co.,
by 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259, 263 (Ct. App. 2000).
No Pos Cited Heppler v. J.M. Peters Co., 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d
497, 512 (Ct. App. 1999).
Yes Pos Cited Crouse v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 80
Cal. Rptr. 2d 94, 119 (Ct. App. 1998).
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Yes Pos Cited
Yes Neg Not Followed
as Dicta
Yes Pos Mentioned
Case
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Charter Oak Fire
Ins. Co., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 429, 432 (Ct.
App. 1998).
Linden Partners v. Wilshire Linden Assocs.
73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 708, 713 (Ct. App. 1998).
Rooz v. Kimmel, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 190
(Ct. App. 1997).
No Pos Mentioned Potvin v. Metro. Life Ins., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d
202, 206 (Ct. App. 1997).
Yes Pos Cited Frank & Freedus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 52 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 678, 682 (Ct. App. 1996).
Yes Pos Cited Hansen Mech., Inc. v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 47, 49 (Ct. App. 1995).
Yes Pos Cited Hood v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296,
298 (Ct. App. 1995).
No Pos Cited Richardson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 827 (Ct. App.
1995).
Yes Pos Cited Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 35
Cal. Rptr. 2d 259, 263 (Ct. App. 1994).
Table 3. California Superior Court (11 Opinions): 11 positive, 0 negative.
Published Treatment Case
N/A Pos Cited Oz Optics Ltd. v. Hakimoglu, No.
2001034488, 2006 WL 3544395 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. July 11, 2006) (order).
N/A Pos Cited Stroker & Stroker v. Allied Packing &
Supply, No. RG05-221544, 2006 WL
4569040 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Mar.
6, 2006) (order).
N/A Pos Cited Magnandonovan v. City of Los Angeles, No.
BC286908, 2006 WL 4749564 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 2006) (order).
N/A Pos Cited Guatelli v. Safeway Inc., No. RG03-134508,
2005 WL 5517887 (Cal. App. Dep't Super.
Ct. Dec. 23, 2005) (order).
N/A Pos Cited Harris v. A.C. Transit, No. RG04-175355,
2005 WL 6272878 (Cal. App. Dep't Super.
Ct. Sept. 9, 2005) (order).
N/A Pos Cited Hillman v. James E. Roberts-Obayashi Corp.,
No. CGC-20-406755, 2005 WL 4991239
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 2005)
(order).
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Published Treatment Case
N/A Pos Cited La Sound v. Fire, No. 02CC11310, 2004 WL
5630488 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Sept.
13, 2004) (order).
N/A Pos Cited Andronico's Markets, Inc. v. Panissimo,
L.L.C., No. 2002-060019, 2004 WL
5229508 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Sept.
7, 2004) (order).
N/A Pos Cited Hirsch v. Brown, No. GIC790944, 2003 WL
25428536 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Dec.
10, 2003) (order).
N/A Pos Cited Yi v. Nam, No. 2001029368, 2002 WL
34078349 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Nov.
25, 2002) (order).
N/A Pos Cited Mendez v. Hertz Rent A Car, No. 00-98278,
2002 WL 34141120 (Cal. App. Dep't Super.
Ct. May 21, 2002) (order).
Table 4. California Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit (3 Opinions): 3 positive, 0
negative.
Published Treatment Case
Yes Pos Cited Aslan v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 125
F.3d 857, 857 (9th Cir 1997).
Yes Pos Cited Yee v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 92 F.3d 1195,
1195 (9th Cir. 1996).
Yes Pos Cited Battin v. First Interstate Mortgage Co., 87
F.3d 1317, 1317 (9th Cir. 1996).
Table 5. U.S. District Courts (California) (7 Opinions): 7 positive, 0
negative, 3 published.
Published Treatment Case
Yes Pos Cited Ito v. Brighton/Shaw, Inc., No. 06 CV 01135
AWI DLB, 2008 WL 3378120, at *9 (E.D.
Cal. Aug. 8, 2008).
Yes Pos Cited Moncada v. Allstate Ins. Co., 471 F. Supp. 2d
987, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
No Pos Cited Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. C 04
01497, 2006 WL 824412, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 28, 2006).
No Pos Cited Smith & Vandiver Corp. v. Felsen-Moscoe-
Mitchell & Assocs., Inc., No. C05-011-2
HRL, 2005 WL 1566552, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
July 5, 2005).
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Published Treatment Case
No Pos Cited Sherman v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., No. CV
03-5730, 2004 WL 4946213, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 17, 2004).
Yes Pos Cited First v. Allstate Ins. Co., 222 F. Supp. 2d
1165, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
No Pos Cited Campanelli v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CV 98-
7185 RJK, 2002 WL 32082245, at *2 (C.D.
Cal. June 18, 2002).
Table 6. U.S. District Courts (other than California)
(2 Opinions): 1 positive, 1 negative, 0 published.
Published Treatment Case
N/A Neg Distinguished Schrum v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
by No. CIV 04-619-PHX-RCB, 2007 WL
1526717, at *7 (D. Ariz. May 23, 2007).
N/A Pos Cited Hegwood v. Ross Stores, Inc., Civil Action No.
3:04-CV-2674-BH (G) ECF, 2006 WL
3422221, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2006).
Table 7. Foreign State Courts (2 Opinions): 2 positive, 0 negative.
Published Treatment Case
N/A Pos Cited Green Mountain Propane Gas v. Kimball, No.
S486-01 CnC, 2005 WL 5895242 (Vt.
Super. Feb. 16, 2005) (order).
N/A Pos Cited Republic Props. Corp. v. Mission W. Props.,
L.P., 2004 WL 5162870 (Md. Cir. Ct. 2004)
(order).

